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ABOLISHING THE TIME TAX ON VOTING
Elora Mukherjee*
A “time tax” is a government policy or practice that forces one citizen to
pay more in time to vote compared with her fellow citizens. While few have
noticed the scope of the problem, data indicate that, due primarily to long
lines, hundreds of thousands if not millions of voters are routinely unable to
vote in national elections as a result of the time tax, and that the problem
disproportionately affects minority voters and voters in the South. This Article documents the problem and offers a roadmap for legal and political strategies for solving it. The Article uses as a case study NAACP State
Conference of Pennsylvania v. Cortés, the first-ever case in which a
court has granted prospective relief to plaintiffs who sought to reduce wait
times at the polls, as well as the first successful voter access case since the
Supreme Court discouraged facial challenges to state voting restrictions in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board. Drawing on the litigation
strategy in Cortés, the Article canvasses the available constitutional and
statutory avenues for a legal challenge to the time tax and identifies conditions for relief to be granted. Those conditions include exhausting the political process, targeting a momentous election and choosing appropriate
plaintiffs, using primary election experiences and expert testimony to develop
an adequate evidentiary record, and seeking narrow and politically neutral
relief. The Article concludes by suggesting policies that can be implemented
at the state and federal levels to mitigate the time tax.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 2008, Richard Brown, a resident of North Philadelphia, arrived at his polling place to cast his ballot in the primary election. He arrived even before the polls opened and joined a line of
eager voters. But when the polls opened at 7:00 a.m., both machines
at his precinct were broken. No one could vote. The line of voters
first grew longer and then shorter as voters left without casting their
ballots. After 9:00 a.m., Brown and remaining voters finally cast their
ballots on a repaired voting machine. Others did not have time to
spare that morning. From 7:00 a.m. to 8:45 a.m., approximately seventy-five to one hundred voters left the precinct without casting a
ballot.1
Did Brown and other voters at his precinct have a constitutional
right to vote without having to wait an inordinately long period of
time? If so, could they enforce that right before the election in which
they sought to vote? State and local officials in Pennsylvania said no.
When questioned by a reporter about the likelihood of many voters
leaving the polls because of long lines in the 2008 general election,
Fred Voight, the Deputy Election Commissioner of Philadelphia,
responded: “Are there lines? Of course there are. Tough. That’s the
1 Declaration of Richard Brown ¶¶ 1–18, NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (No. 2:08-cv-05048).
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way it works. . . . People are always going to have to wait in line. I
mean, get a life.”2
It is hardly surprising that Voight and other government officials
could not fathom that long lines at the polls could violate a voter’s
constitutional rights.3 Waits at the polls have long been considered
“garden variety election irregularities”4 that are par for the course in
every election.5 Prior to the 2008 election, no federal court had ever
held that a state policy that would contribute to long lines at the polls
in an upcoming election violated a voter’s constitutional rights. That
changed when NAACP State Conference of Pennsylvania v. Cortés6 was
decided days before the 2008 election.
In October 2008, Brown—together with other voters, the NAACP
State Conference of Pennsylvania, and the Election Law Network—
headed to federal court. They sought statewide preliminary injunctive
relief requiring poll workers to distribute emergency paper ballots to
voters when half or more of the electronic voting machines in a precinct became inoperable on Election Day. They argued that such
relief would prevent many voters from being turned away from the
polls by long lines. Chief Judge Harvey Bartle III of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the relief.7 He found that the potential
injury to the plaintiffs and other voters throughout the Common2 Philly Official Scoffs at Voting Problems (American News Project online video Oct.
17, 2008), http://www.americannewsproject.com/videos/155. When asked whether
poll workers should take simple measures, such as distributing paper ballots, to alleviate long lines, Voight dismissed those suggestions: “A long line is not justification for
anything except waiting.” Voters Sue Pennsylvania, Election Official Scoffs (American
News Project online video Oct. 23, 2008), http://americannewsproject.com/videos/
voters-sue-pennsylvania-election-official-scoffs.
3 According to the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Pedro A. Cortés, “prospective fears of long lines . . . are at most a trivial burden on
voting rights and are not a Constitutional violation.” Memorandum of Law of
Defendants Secretary Pedro A. Cortés and Commissioner Chet Harnut in Opposition
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 27, Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (No.
2:08-cv-05048) [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum of Law].
4 Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1076 (1st Cir. 1978).
5 See, e.g., id. at 1076–78; Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975)
(affirming district court decision that long lines at polls caused by, among other factors, voting machine malfunctions were “at most irregularities caused by mechanical
or human error” that “did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”). As
recently as the eve of the 2004 general election, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit explained that the prospect of long lines at the polls “does not amount to the
severe burden upon the right to vote” and a line-producing procedure need not be
declared unconstitutional. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v.
Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2004).
6 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
7 Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
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wealth would, if it occurred, violate the Equal Protection Clause.8 To
prevent such a violation, the court ordered the Commonwealth to
implement the plaintiffs’ proposal.
Cortés is a landmark voting rights case. It is the first to recognize
that the prospect of long lines at the polls may constitute a “time tax”9
and that state policies that impose such lines can cause an injury of
constitutional magnitude. Like the poll tax, the time tax burdens a
citizen’s fundamental right to vote. It is a government policy or practice that forces one citizen to pay more in time to vote compared with
her neighbor across town, across the state, across state lines, or even
across the street.
The time tax may result from statewide election policy—which
the plaintiffs challenged in Cortés—or from problematic election
infrastructure, such as insufficient numbers of polling locations, voting machines, and poll workers to efficiently accommodate all those
who seek to vote.10 Whatever the cause, the effect is long lines that
severely burden the right to vote. Those who cannot afford to wait—
say, because of work obligations, family responsibilities, or health constraints that do not pause for Election Day—are denied the right to
vote.
Until very recently, data on the time tax were simply unavailable,
and so very few noticed its disenfranchising effects. In the 2008 election, more than ten million voters had to wait longer than an hour to
vote and hundreds of thousands had to wait longer than five hours.11
Hundreds of thousands more left the polls without casting a ballot
because lines were too long. Hundreds of thousands of others were so
discouraged by long lines that they did not show up at the polls at all.
Comprehensive data, available in 2008 for the first time, reveals
that the time tax falls disproportionately on particular segments of the
U.S. electorate. In 2008, blacks bore the brunt of the time tax bur8 Id. at 765.
9 The phrase “time tax” appears to have first been used in print by Berkeley Law
School Dean Christopher Edley, Jr. His protest of the time tax appeared in the Washington Post on October 28, 2008, the same day that Judge Bartle held a hearing in
Cortés. See Christopher Edley, Jr., A Voting Rights Disaster?, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2008,
at A17.
10 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, PREPARING FOR A SURGE IN VOTER TURNOUT IN THE
NOVEMBER 2008 GENERAL ELECTION 3 (2008), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/pdfs/vpp/PollingPlaceResourcesReport.pdf. The plaintiffs in Virginia
State Conference of NAACP v. Kaine challenged problematic infrastructure on the eve of
the 2008 general election. Complaint at 25–26, Va. State Conference of NAACP v.
Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D. Va. dismissed Nov. 18, 2008). For further discussion of
Kaine, see discussion infra Part IV.E.
11 See discussion infra Part II.A.
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den, as did Latinos to a lesser extent. While only 5% of whites nationwide waited longer than an hour to vote in 2008, 15% of blacks and
8% of Hispanics waited that long.12 In the South, wait times were
longer than elsewhere in the country.13 There, approximately 8% of
white voters, 19% of blacks, and 14.5% of Hispanics waited longer
than an hour to cast a ballot.14
Polling data suggest that it does not take an unusually long wait to
severely burden the right to vote. If all registered voters in the United
States were required to wait just sixty minutes to vote on Election Day,
that wait time alone might turn away more than 40% of registered
voters.15 A generation ago, both political action and litigation were
needed to abolish poll taxes. This Article is a primer on how to do the
same to the equally intolerable tax on voters’ time.
Part I examines Cortés as a case study of successful voter access
litigation that reduced the time tax. It reviews the political backdrop
of the case, the court battle that ensued, and why the victory matters.
In doing so, particular attention is paid to how plaintiffs created an
evidentiary record in support of their facial challenge to Pennsylvania’s election policy. This exercise is necessary in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board,16 where the Court rejected a facial challenge to Indiana’s voter
identification law on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate “how common” disenfranchisement was as a result of the
law.17 Post-Crawford, those pursuing a facial challenge to a state election policy bear a particularly high evidentiary burden. Thus far, the
only federal constitutional case in which plaintiffs seeking to guarantee access to the franchise have surmounted that burden is Cortés.18
Part II places the time tax in national and historical context. Little was known about the time tax until very recently. I first review the
available data on its burdens, and then suggest three reasons why
policymakers, judges, litigators, academics, and voters should be concerned about the time tax. The first is pragmatic: assuming a nonrandom distribution of wait times, votes lost due to the time tax can
decide close elections. The second focuses on electoral access: no
votes should be lost due to an administrative hurdle like long waits.
The third and arguably the most pressing concern relates to equality:
12 See infra tbl. 3.
13 See infra tbl. 4.
14 See infra tbl. 5.
15 See infra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
16 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
17 Id. at 1623.
18 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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the time tax appears to disproportionately burden racial minorities
and those in certain regions of the country.
Part III explores six doctrinal bases for challenging a time tax: the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.19 Although litigation
challenging the time tax has been successful on only Equal Protection
grounds to date, the other grounds are virtually untested and ripe for
litigation in this emerging area of law.
Part IV offers a model for voter access litigation. It suggests five
conditions for judicial relief to be granted: exhausting the political
process, a momentous pending election, seeking pre- rather than
post-election relief, bringing sufficient evidence to succeed on a facial
challenge, and pursuing narrow and politically neutral relief. None of
these criteria alone is sufficient to obtain federal court intervention
against long lines. The presence of all of the criteria does not guarantee such intervention. But these factors are what a federal court is
likely to consider in deciding whether or not to grant relief to voters
seeking to ensure access to the franchise.
Part V argues that a judicial victory against the time tax should
not be the endgame. Rather, policymakers, advocates, and voters ultimately must use the political process to mitigate the sweeping burdens
imposed by the time tax. Part V reviews a number of measures worth
advocating on a state-by-state basis to reduce the time tax, including a
relatively low-cost means of ensuring that no voter is turned away due
to long lines at the polls: distributing paper ballots. Part V also suggests a potential congressional remedy for mitigating the time tax:
amending the Help America Vote Act to allow for the use of paper
and provisional ballots by those who, when faced with a long line at a
polling booth, cannot afford to wait.
I. THE TIME TAX

IN

PENNSYLVANIA

A. Unsuccessful Lobbying Efforts
The story of Cortés begins with the April 22, 2008 statewide primary in Pennsylvania, which included the presidential primary contests.20 At polling places throughout the Commonwealth, many voters
were forced to leave the polls before casting their ballots because of
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (2006).
20 Fed. Election Comm’n, 2008 Presidential Primary Dates and Candidate Filing
Deadlines for Ballot Access 2 (2008), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2008pdates.pdf.
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long lines caused by inoperable voting machines.21 Most of the
problems with inoperable voting machines and long lines occurred in
precincts with higher than average concentrations of poverty and people of color.22 The 2008 primary experience was consistent with prior
Pennsylvania elections fraught with the disparate imposition of the
time tax on voters.23
The long lines afflicting the 2008 primary should not have come
as a surprise to any observer of Pennsylvania elections, least of all
Commonwealth officials. It was widely known that direct-recording
electronic voting (“DRE”) machines, used in fifty of sixty-seven Pennsylvania counties,24 routinely broke down on Election Day. According
to Dr. Michael Ian Shamos, a computer scientist at Carnegie Mellon
University who has served as the principal consultant to the Commonwealth on DRE machines since 2004, approximately ten percent of
DRE machines fail in some respect during the average thirteen hours
the machines are in use on an election day.25 Other researchers have
found failure rates as high as twenty percent when DRE machines are
tested under conditions replicating an election day.26
After the primary, public pressure mounted on Commonwealth
officials to develop a mechanism for ensuring access to the franchise
in the event of DRE machine failures. For the first time, the Pennsylvania Department of State—headed by Secretary Pedro A. Cortés,
an appointee of Democratic Governor Edward Rendell—began to
consider a uniform policy that would allow the use of emergency
21 See Letter from Kathryn Boockvar, Senior Att’y at Advancement Project, to
Albert Masland, Chief Counsel, Pa. Dep’t of State (June 12, 2008) (on file with
author).
22 See id. In Cortés, the Commonwealth argued that these problems were insignificant because in none of these counties was more than two percent of precincts
afflicted by an inoperable machine. See Declaration of Harry A. VanSickle ¶ 17,
NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (No.
2:08-cv-05048).
23 See, e.g., VOTERSUNITE.ORG ET AL., E-VOTING FAILURES IN THE 2006 MID-TERM
ELECTIONS 17–18 (2007), http://www.votersunite.org/info/E-VotingIn2006MidTerm.pdf (focusing on problems in Allegheny County during the 2006 mid-term
election).
24 Declaration of Harry A. VanSickle, supra note 22, ¶ 15.
25 Michael Ian Shamos, Voting as an Engineering Problem, BRIDGE, Summer 2007, at
35, 38. According to Shamos, “[v]oting machines are among the least reliable devices
on this planet.” Id. at 38.
26 MATT BISHOP ET AL., ANALYSIS OF VOLUME TESTING OF THE ACCUVOTE TSX/
ACCUVIEW 4 (2005), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/
vstaab_volume_test_report.pdf.

R

\\server05\productn\N\NDL\85-1\NDL105.txt

184

unknown

Seq: 8

notre dame law review

30-NOV-09

7:57

[vol. 85:1

paper ballots in the event of voting machine failures.27 Until then,
the Commonwealth had offered local election officials no guidance
whatsoever on whether or not they should distribute paper ballots if
some or all DRE machines in a precinct broke down.28 Across the
Commonwealth, various counties, elected inspectors of elections, and
even individual poll workers used their own judgment to determine
whether or not to distribute emergency paper ballots to voters.29
Voter-rights groups argued that this lack of uniformity caused
unequal access to the ballot box and disenfranchised voters who could
not afford to wait until DRE machines were repaired.30 A broad coalition of public interest groups urged Secretary Cortés to ensure more
equal access to the franchise for the general election. Seventeen organizations—including local, statewide, and national civil rights and voting rights groups—presented a proposal to Secretary Cortés on
August 26, 2008, asking for a directive, binding on the counties, that
would require poll workers to offer emergency paper ballots to voters
as soon as half of the voting machines in a precinct were not
functioning.31
Secretary Cortés rejected the proposal.32 Instead, on September
3, 2008, he issued a directive requiring the distribution of emergency
paper ballots only when all DRE machines in a precinct were simultaneously inoperable.33 The Directive mandated the use of emergency
27 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 5–6; see also 25 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3031.20(b), 3031.5(a) (West 2007) (providing that the Secretary of
State “may issue directives or instructions for implementation of electronic voting procedures and for the operation of electronic voting systems.”).
28 See Declaration of Harry A. VanSickle, supra note 22, ¶¶ 23–24.
29 Press Statement, Advancement Project, Voting Rights Groups Call for Equal
Rights in PA Election Administration and Uniform Standards for Emergency Paper
Ballots (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.voteraction.org/node/583.
30 See Letter from Kathryn Boockvar, Senior Att’y at Advancement Project, to
Albert Masland, Chief Counsel, Pa. Dep’t of State (Aug. 26, 2008) (on file with
author).
31 Id.; see also Complaint at 16–17, NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591
F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
32 Declaration of Harry A. VanSickle, supra note 22, ¶ 31.
33 See Pennsylvania Dep’t of State, Directive Concerning the Use, Implementation
and Operation of Electronic Voting Systems by the County Boards of Elections 3
(Sept. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Directive], available at http://voteraction.org/files/
EVS%20Directive%20Final%20090308.pdf (“[I]f all electronic voting machines in a
precinct are inoperable, paper ballots . . . for registering votes . . . shall be distributed
immediately to eligible voters . . . .” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). While the Directive left open the theoretical possibility of distributing
paper ballots when fewer than all voting machines were inoperable, state officials testified that paper ballots would be distributed only when all machines were nonfunc-
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paper ballots only until a single machine was repaired or replaced,
regardless of the condition of the remainder of the machines at the
precinct or how long voters were waiting to cast a ballot.34
The Directive was fundamentally flawed. It provided assistance to
voters in only the most extreme case of a catastrophic precinct-wide
failure of all machines; it provided no assistance at all to voters in the
far more likely circumstance of a breakdown of fewer than all available machines. After Secretary Cortés issued the Directive, it was clear
that lobbying efforts to mitigate long lines at the polls statewide had
not succeeded.35 Voters and public interest groups were left with two
choices—to sit back and wait as thousands of voters faced inevitable
long lines on Election Day or to pursue relief in court, however
unlikely success might be. They chose the latter course.
B. The Court Battle
On October 23, 2008,36 three individual voters who had difficulties voting in the April primary, together with the Election Reform
Network and the statewide NAACP, filed Cortés. The plaintiffs sought
the same relief that had been requested of Secretary Cortés: a directive requiring poll workers to distribute emergency paper ballots to
voters when half the DRE machines in a precinct were nonoperational
on Election Day (the “Fifty Percent Rule”).37 The plaintiffs argued
that without the requested relief, hundreds, if not thousands, of voters
would have their right to vote severely burdened in violation of the
tioning and in no other circumstances, so that there would be uniformity across the
Commonwealth. See Second Declaration of Aaron Zisser ¶¶ 2–4, Cortés, 591 F. Supp.
2d 757 (No. 2:08-cv-05048).
34 Directive, supra note 33, at 3 (“Emergency paper ballots shall be used . . . until
the county board of elections is able to make the necessary repairs to the machine(s)
or is able to place into operation a suitable substitute machine(s).”).
35 Thereafter, civil rights groups continued to lobby at the local level for the distribution of paper ballots. See, e.g., Aaron Zisser, Editorial, Spoiled Voters or a Spoiled
Election, SUNDAY SUN (Phila.), Oct. 12, 2008, at 7.
36 After the September 3 Directive was issued, the NAACP State Conference of
Pennsylvania joined forces with Voter Action, the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP), and the law firm of Heller Ehrman to develop litigation to reduce
long lines at the polls on Election Day. Several weeks later, however, the team lost a
critical member as it was announced that Heller Ehrman would dissolve. See
Jonathan D. Glater, Big Law Firm May Vote to Dissolve, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at C9.
Thereafter, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLP, the firm where I practice law,
joined the team on extremely short notice.
37 Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
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Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and the First
Amendment.38
Five days later, on October 28, 2008, Judge Bartle held an eighthour evidentiary hearing in the case. At the hearing, the Commonwealth argued that the Fifty Percent Rule was unworkable39: it would
cause confusion and chaos at the polls, it would be difficult to provide
privacy to voters using such ballots, those ballots might be tampered
with and would increase the risk of an overvote,40 and any last minute
changes to statewide election policy would be unduly burdensome to
implement. The Commonwealth further argued that the relief was
unwarranted because it did not “see the constitutional burden on the
right to vote.”41 The plaintiffs’ claims were merely “speculative,”42 a
“parade of horribles, of perspective [sic] horribles.”43 No federal
court had ever granted the type of prospective relief the plaintiffs
sought.44
The plaintiffs countered with evidence of voter disenfranchisement in the April primary caused by DRE machine failures,45 statistical evidence on the likelihood of DRE machine breakdowns,46 and
poll workers who said they would have no problems distributing paper
ballots to voters if half of the DRE machines in their precincts broke
down.47
Because the plaintiffs advanced a facial challenge to Commonwealth policy, their burden was heavy. Just months before in Crawford,
the Supreme Court had rejected a facial challenge to Indiana’s photo
identification law, which required voters to present ID before casting a
ballot at the polls.48 There, voters and the Democratic Party argued
38 At the time, Pennsylvania did not allow for no-excuses absentee voting. To
qualify for an absentee ballot in Pennsylvania in 2008, a voter had to qualify as, inter
alia, absent from her municipality because of electoral duties, occupation, military
service, illness or disability, or religious observance. See Pa. Dep’t of State, Voting by
Absentee Ballot, http://www.votespa.com/HowToVote/VotingbyAbsenteeBallot/
tabid/78/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
39 See Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 766–67.
40 An overvote results from extraneous marks on the ballot which might result in
a ballot not being counted at all.
41 Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 357, Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d
757 (No. 2:08-cv-05048) [hereinafter Preliminary Injunction Hearing].
42 Id. at 358.
43 Id. at 360.
44 Id. at 361–62.
45 See Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
46 See id.
47 See Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 191–92.
48 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); see also
Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature
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that the law burdened the right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.49 Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined, ruled against the petitioners
on evidentiary grounds: the petitioners had failed to demonstrate
“how common” voter disenfranchisement was as a result of the law50
and no evidence in the record showed that the statute imposed
“‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters.”51
“A facial challenge must fail where the statute has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep’”52 and “‘imposes only a limited burden on voters’
rights.’ ”53 Post-Crawford, the only successful federal constitutional challenge (facial or as applied) to state election practices that
pose obstacles to the franchise has been Cortés.54 For this reason, it
and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law
Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1667–72 (discussing Crawford’s implications for facial
and as-applied challenges in election law cases); discussion infra Part IV.D (analyzing
standing and ripeness in election disputes post-Crawford).
49 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
50 Id. at 1623.
51 Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)).
52 Id. (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct.
1184, 1190 (2008)).
53 Id. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992)).
54 Specifically, Cortés has been the only successful constitutional voter-access case
challenging state election administration in the period from April 28, 2008, when
Crawford was issued, to October 19, 2009. During this time, one voter-access challenge has been successful on statutory grounds, namely the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Ray v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections, No. 2:08-cv-1086, 2008 WL
4966759, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2008). In the same period, numerous constitutional challenges to state election practices have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Simmons
v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 70 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting challenge to state statute disenfranchising incarcerated felons); Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir.
2009) (rejecting challenge to city law extending the term limit for certain elected
officials); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1353–57 (11th Cir.
2009) (rejecting challenge to state photo ID law); ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546
F.3d 1313, 1321–25 (10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting challenge to city photo ID law); In re
Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now, No. 08-14419-J (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2008)
(unpublished order) (denying petitioners’ writ of mandamus and affirming district
court finding that petitioners had not made a prima facie showing of infringement on
associational right); Fla. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237,
1251–59 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (rejecting challenge to state voter identification law); Stewart v. Marion County, No. 1:08-cv-586, 2008 WL 4690984, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21,
2008) (same); Ray v. Texas, No. 2-06-cv-385, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59852, at *15–21
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2008) (rejecting challenge to state absentee voting laws); Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69542, at *81–86
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (rejecting challenges by eligible voters with visual and manual disabilities to voting systems). It is worth noting that, during this same period,
one ballot access case has been successful, see Moore v. Brunner, No. 2:08-cv-224, 2008
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is worth reviewing in some detail the evidence that the plaintiffs
presented.55
The plaintiffs began with narratives of disenfranchisement from
the April primary. Plaintiff Angel Coleman testified that she could
not vote on the morning of the primary due to lines at the polls,
which resulted from two of the three DRE machines at her Philadelphia precinct being broken.56 Although Coleman waited in line
about fifteen minutes,57 she could not wait longer because, as a single
mother, she needed to take her son to school and then report to
work.58 Likewise, plaintiff Genevieve Geis, a kindergarten teacher, testified that she could not vote on the morning of the primary at her
precinct in Montgomery County, a suburb northwest of Philadelphia.59 A poll worker refused to let any voters enter because all the
voting machines were broken, yelling, “[G]o home, [the machines]
[a]re broken . . . come back later.”60 Geis could not wait for the
machines to be fixed; she had to report to work.61 As Coleman and
Geis left the polls, others did the same without casting a ballot.62
That Coleman and Geis could not afford to wait to vote did not in
any way reflect that voting was not important to them. Coleman was
“very passionate”63 about voting but was “torn” about whether she
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64463, at *12–14 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2008) (granting preliminary
injunction to place the Socialist Party and its candidates on the 2008 general election
ballot in Ohio); Moore v. Brunner, No. 2:08-cv-224, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43737, at
*4–15 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2008) (enjoining directive prohibiting unregistered and
nonresident voters from circulating petitions for President); as well as a challenge to a
state public financing scheme for candidates for state offices, see Green Party of Conn.
v. Garfield, No. 3:06-cv-1030, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78188, at *226–38 (D. Conn. Aug.
27, 2009); and a challenge to Puerto Rico’s Spanish-only ballot system, see Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon, 587 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344–51 (D.P.R. 2008).
55 It is also worth noting what evidence plaintiffs did not present. Plaintiffs did
not present evidence on the frequency of long waits during the primary election, or
on the number of precincts that actually experienced DRE machine failures in the
primary, and of those, the percentage of occurrences when more than half of the
machines were nonfunctional. Plaintiffs could not present this evidence because the
Commonwealth had not collected it.
56 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 55.
57 Id. at 60.
58 Id. at 55, 58; Declaration of Angel Coleman ¶¶ 3–12, NAACP State Conference
of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (No. 2:08-cv-05048).
59 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 271–73.
60 Id. at 272.
61 Id. at 273–74.
62 Declaration of Angel Coleman, supra note 58, ¶ 13; Declaration of Genevieve
Geis ¶¶ 4–5, Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (No. 2:08-cv-05048).
63 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 56.
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could wait to cast a ballot if faced with long lines.64 Simply because
one person has “more responsibilities [than] somebody else,” she
explained, does not mean she should be denied the right to vote.65
For Geis, voting was “important” because “people have fought for the
right to vote for a long time,” but she worried that long lines would
force her to leave the polls.66 These narratives invoked the experiences of people throughout the Commonwealth who would struggle
to balance competing responsibilities with a commitment to voting if
faced with long wait times on Election Day.
Whyatt Mondesire, the President of the NAACP State Conference
of Pennsylvania, reiterated these themes with a focus on his constituents. He testified that he had frequently seen breakdowns of DRE
machines “in low income, African American neighborhoods.”67 The
resulting disenfranchisement caused “[f]rustration, anxiety, [and]
anger” among these voters because “they think that their voting
franchise is going to be robbed from or taken from them” and “[they]
tend to think that it was done on purpose.”68
Plaintiffs supplemented these and other narratives of disenfranchisement with statistical evidence demonstrating that the Fifty
Percent Rule would enfranchise significantly more voters than the
Commonwealth’s Directive: 90% of Philadelphia’s precincts are
equipped with two or fewer machines and more than 99% have three
or fewer machines, a distribution not atypical of precincts in the Pennsylvania counties that rely on DRE machines.69 Where at least one but
fewer than all machines fail, the Directive meant that a precinct would
function at dramatically lower voter capacity than the Commonwealth
had previously deemed permissible.70 This was particularly problem64 Id. at 58.
65 Id. at 59.
66 Id. at 275–76.
67 Id. at 149.
68 Id.
69 See NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (E.D.
Pa. 2008).
70 When approving any DRE machine, the Secretary of State must issue a report
which “shall specify . . . the number of voters who may reasonably be accommodated
by the voting devices.” 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3031.5(b) (West 2007). Any county
that adopts an approved system “shall provide the components of such a system in a
number no less than that sufficient to accommodate the voters of that county or
municipality in accordance with the minimum capacity standards so prescribed by the
secretary.” Id. As of the 2008 election, the Secretary had determined that each
model 1242 DRE unit could accommodate at least 350 voters on Election Day. See
PEDRO A. CORTÉS, PA. DEP’T OF STATE, EXAMINATION RESULTS OF DANAHER INDUSTRIAL
CONTROLS’ ELECTRONIC 1242 DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM WITH

\\server05\productn\N\NDL\85-1\NDL105.txt

190

unknown

Seq: 14

notre dame law review

30-NOV-09

7:57

[vol. 85:1

atic because 23% of precincts already had more registered voters
assigned to them than state law permitted.71
The plaintiffs’ voting technology expert, Douglas Jones, testified
that the failure rate for DRE machines ranges from 8% to 20%.72
Assuming a conservative failure rate of 10% would mean that in any
given two-machine precinct, there is an 18% probability that the precinct will be operating at half of its capacity by the end of an election
day but only a 1% probability that both machines will be nonfunctioning by the end of an election day.73 These estimates mean “[i]t’s
highly likely that the failures will occur,” and “a lot of precincts [will]
fac[e] difficulties.”74 A rule requiring emergency paper ballots to be
made available to voters when half the machines are nonfunctioning
would significantly mitigate lines compared with the Commonwealth’s
Directive.75
Given that Pennsylvania polls are open for only thirteen hours,
the plaintiffs presented testimony on the time-consuming process of
fixing or replacing a nonfunctioning DRE machine on Election Day.76
Poll workers testified that such delays caused long lines and caused
voters to leave the polls without casting a ballot.77 Poll workers also
testified that the Fifty Percent Rule would be easy to implement since
they were already accustomed to handling thousands of paper provisional ballots, paper absentee ballots, and paper ballots from
overseas.78
C. Lowering Pennsylvania’s Time Tax
On October 29, 2008, less than twenty hours after the hearing
concluded, Judge Bartle announced that on Election Day in PennGUARDIAN ELECTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 8 (2005), http://www.dos.state.pa.us/dos/
lib/dos/press/danaher_report_120105.pdf.
71 Declaration of Stephanie Frank Singer ¶ 3, Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (No.
2:08-cv-05048); see also 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2702 (West 2007) (limiting capacity
of individual precincts to 1200 registered voters).
72 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 105–06; see Shamos, supra
note 25, at 38; BISHOP ET AL., supra note 26, at 4. Defendants did not introduce contrary evidence.
73 See Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 108; Declaration of
Daniel P. Lopresti ¶ 18, Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (No. 2:08-cv-05048); see also Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 108 (describing what a failure rate of
eight to ten percent would mean to a precinct with two or three DRE machines).
74 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 109.
75 Id. at 114–15.
76 See Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 760–62.
77 Id. at 761.
78 See id. at 762–63.
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sylvania, emergency paper ballots would be distributed at a precinct
when half or more of the DRE machines were nonoperational.79 He
explained, “The right to vote is at the foundation of our constitutional
form of government. Ultimately, all our freedoms depend on it.”80
Within hours, Secretary Cortés announced that defendants would not
appeal the decision and would ensure uniform application of the Fifty
Percent Rule.81
More than any prior opinion, Cortés reflects an acute sensitivity to
voters’ time constraints on Election Day:
It is undisputed that the turnout as always will be concentrated in
the first several hours of voting before people go to work and after
5:00 p.m. after their return from work. Even in the best of circumstances, voters can expect and must tolerate more delay than usual
on November 4. Nonetheless, we would be blind to reality if we did
not recognize that many individuals have a limited window of
opportunity to go to the polls due to their jobs, child care and family responsibilities, or other weighty commitments. Life does not
stop on election day. Many must vote early or in the evening if they
are to vote at all.82

The decision explains that the combination of voters’ time constraints, high turnout, voting machine failures, and limited voting
hours would result in disenfranchisement because when machines fail
“time is of the essence. The polls are open for one day and one day
only and then for only 13 hours. There is no rain date.”83
While the opinion is long on facts, it is understandably concise in
its legal reasoning. The legal analysis begins by explaining the importance of voting in a democracy.84 It then applies the balancing test set
forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze,85 which requires courts to consider all
relevant factors in weighing the right to vote against state-imposed
limitations on the voting process.86 Applying Anderson, the court con79 Id. at 767–68.
80 Id. at 767.
81 Press Release, Pa. Dep’t of State, Secretary Cortés Responds to Court Decision
(Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://www.dos.state.pa.us/dos/lib/dos/press/2008/dospaperballotinjunctgrantedrel102908.pdf.
82 Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 764.
85 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
86 The Anderson test provides:
Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws
. . . cannot be resolved by any “litmus-paper test” that will separate valid from
invalid restrictions. . . . [A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Four-
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cluded that the likelihood of long lines caused by DRE machine
breakdowns would violate voters’ constitutional rights:
Based on the record before us, we find that there is a real danger that a significant number of machines will malfunction throughout the Commonwealth, and this occurrence is likely to cause
unacceptably long lines on November 4 . . . . The delay resulting
from a situation where 50% or more of the voting machines are
inoperable will unduly burden and thus deprive many citizens of
their right to vote. This injury, if it occurs, will be of the gravest
magnitude and will give rise to a violation of at least the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.87

In support of its one-sentence Equal Protection analysis, the court
cited two cases: Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,88 which struck
down Virginia’s poll tax, and O’Brien v. Skinner,89 which invalidated
New York’s policy of failing to provide qualified voters—pretrial
detainees and misdemeanants—with means of registering and voting.
Judge Bartle did not analyze either of these cases, nor did he reach
the plaintiffs’ Due Process or First Amendment claims.90
On Election Day, Judge Bartle’s order appears to have been
implemented in at least some counties. Limited data released by the
Commonwealth show that in every Philadelphia and Delaware County
precinct in which emergency paper ballots were distributed, the ballots were distributed because at least half of the DRE machines broke
down—not because all machines were simultaneously nonfunctional.91 While some Pennsylvania voters waited one to two hours to
cast their ballots, and while others in Philadelphia waited longer than
teenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court
must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors is
the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision
is unconstitutional.
Id. at 789 (citation omitted).
87 Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
88 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
89 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
90 Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 765–66.
91 See E-mail from Ian Harlow, Deputy Comm’r, Pa. Bureau of Comm’ns, Elections and Legislation, to Aaron B. Zisser, Staff Attorney, PILCOP (Jan. 28, 2009, 9:48
EST) (on file with author). The Commonwealth has not released statewide data on
this issue.
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five hours, these wait times were not attributed to DRE machine
breakdowns92—a mark of the success of Cortés.
Following the election, on January 28, 2009, the district court
issued an order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent
injunction, so that the Fifty Percent Rule will remain in place indefinitely.93 The time for appealing that order has long passed.
II. THE TIME TAX NATIONWIDE
A. Its Scope
It appears that neither the federal government nor any state has
ever made data publicly available on how long voters have waited
before casting a ballot. Until 2004, no federal agency had ever
attempted to systematically collect data on wait times at the polls or
the causes of long lines.94 That year, when the federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC) tried to gather data on these issues for the
first time, it could not because of what it called “survey confusion,”
which led the EAC to conclude that “answers are not possible at this
time.”95 Neither the 2006 nor the 2008 EAC surveys asked questions
about wait times at the polls.96 At the state level, there do not appear
to be any states that have made comprehensive data publicly available
on the length of lines at the polls.97
92 See Editorial, Bring Early Voting to Pennsylvania, READING EAGLE (Pa.), Nov. 10,
2008, at C4; Pauline Vu, Election Day Mostly Smooth, STATELINE.ORG, Nov. 6, 2008,
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=353684.
93 Order, Jan. 28, 2009, Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2009) (No.
2:08-cv-5048).
94 Perhaps the dearth of centralized data is not surprising given the extent of
local control over the administration of elections in the United States.
95 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE 2004 ELECTION DAY
SURVEY, at 10-2 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2004 SURVEY],
available at http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/2004-election-day-survey-1; see also id.
pt. 3, at 7 (noting “[c]onfusion over question wording in the 2004 survey prevents
proper analysis from being conducted on one potential cause of the long lines in
various states”).
96 See U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 2006 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION & VOTING SURVEY (2007), available at http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/2006-electionadministration-and-voting-survey/?searchterm=2006ElectionAdministration&voting
Survey; U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2008 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION & VOTING
SURVEY (2008), available at http://www.eac.gov/program-areas/research-resourcesand-reports/eac-research-in-progress/2008-election-administration-voting-survey-1/
attachment_download/file.
97 Heather Gerken has suggested, and I agree, that “[t]here’s no reason that
state[s] and localities, with adequate financial support and the help of nonprofit
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Not only has the issue of wait times on Election Day been off the
radar of state and federal governments, it also has been overlooked by
polling organizations until recently. Only in the last five years has any
attempt been made to collect national data on long lines. In 2004, the
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press was the first polling
organization to collect national data about wait times at the polls, and
it gathered data on this issue again in 2006 and 2008.98
Pew’s surveys reveal the startling length of time that significant
numbers of voters reported they must wait to cast a ballot. In 2004,
42% of voters reported that they had to wait in line to cast a ballot, of
whom 14% waited one to two hours, and 5% waited longer than two
hours. For the 2006 midterm elections, 28% of voters reported that
they had to wait to cast a ballot, of whom 7% waited one to two hours,
and 4% waited longer than two hours. In 2008, 36% of voters had to
wait to cast a ballot (on Election Day or during in-person early voting), of whom 17% waited one to two hours, and 11% waited longer
than two hours. Table 1 summarizes how long voters waited in 2004,
2006, and 2008, according to Pew data.
TABLE 1. WAIT TIMES

AT THE

POLLS, 2004–2008

Data from the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 99
In-Person Voters
Percentage who waited in line
Of those who waited, percentage
under 15 minutes
Of those who waited, percentage
15 to 29 minutes
Of those who waited, percentage
30 to 59 minutes
Of those who waited, percentage
1 to under 2 hours
Of those who waited, percentage
2 hours or more

2004
42%

2006 2008
28% 36%

who waited

31%

50% 31%

who waited

6%

25% 22%

who waited

24%

11% 19%

who waited

14%

7% 17%

who waited

5%

4% 11%

groups” cannot collect and report information on lines and other problems afflicting
elections. HEATHER GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 141 (2009).
98 See infra notes 102–06.
99 These data come from telephone polling conducted by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press. In each year listed, the Pew Center interviewed
registered voters shortly after Election Day, and the full results of each survey are
available online. See Pew Research Center Poll Database, Nov. 2004 Election Poll: Q.
39, available at http://people-press.org/questions/?qid=1610768&pid=51&ccid=51#
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According to Pew, waiting in line was the problem voters
reported most frequently. Of those who voted in the 2006 election,
96% did not have any problems or difficulties in voting other than
waiting in line;100 in 2008, that percentage was 97%.101
In 2008, Pew was not the only source of national data on wait
times. The Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), a consortium of more than 150 university researchers, collected detailed
nationwide data on wait times that voters faced in the 2008 election.102
According to CCES data, in 2008, 6% of those who voted—or nearly 8
million people—waited longer than an hour to cast a ballot, with an
average wait time of seventy-five minutes.103 As Table 2 illustrates,
those who cast an in-person ballot during early voting generally waited
significantly longer than those who voted on Election Day: Whereas
5% of voters on Election Day waited longer than an hour, 10% waited
that long during early voting.

top; Pew Research Center Poll Database, Nov. 2006 Election Poll: Q. 14, available at
http://people-press.org/questions/?qid=1670427&pid=51&ccid=50#top; Pew
Research Center Poll Database, Nov. 2008 Election Poll: Q. 43, available at http://
people-press.org/questions/?qid=1720783&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
100 See Pew Research Center Poll Database, Nov. 2006 Election Poll: Q. 15, available at http://people-press.org/questions/?qid=1670428&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
101 See Pew Research Center Poll Database, Nov. 2008 Election Poll: Q. 45, available at http://people-press.org/questions/?qid=1720785&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
102 That survey was based on data collected from 32,800 individuals. See STEPHEN
ANSOLABEHERE, GUIDE TO THE COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION SURVEY (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6), available at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/
material/CCES_Guide_2008_Rough_Draft_v2.pdf.
103 These data were reported to me in an interview and subsequent correspondence with Stephen Ansolabehere, the CCES project’s lead researcher. The calculation of nearly 8 million voters waiting longer than an hour to cast a ballot relies on
Ansolabehere’s testimony that there were 133 million voters in the 2008 General Election. See Voter Registration: Assessing Current Problems: Hearing Before the S. Rules Comm.,
111th Cong. 4 (2009) [hereinafter Voter Registration hearing] (testimony of Stephen
Ansolabehere, Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University).
There are notable differences in the wait times reported to Pew and CCES, with
the wait times reported to Pew being significantly longer than those reported to
CCES. While explaining the differences is beyond the scope of this Article, even the
more conservative CCES data reveals the significant and burdensome wait times
required of millions of voters.
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2008

Data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey104
Wait Time at Poll
Not at all
Less than 10
minutes
10 to 30 minutes
31 to 60 minutes
Longer than 60
minutes

2008 Election
Overall
37%

November 4,
2008
40%

Early In-Person
Voting
28%

28%

28%

26%

19%
10%
6%
(average wait of
75 minutes)

18%
10%

23%
12%

5%

10%

The CCES data are the first comprehensive source that can be
used to examine whether or not the burden of waiting to vote falls
disproportionately on particular segments of the U.S. population.
According to the data, there was no statistically significant correlation
between wait times at the polls in 2008 and income or education.105
However, there are stark racial and regional differences in the times
that voters had to wait to cast a ballot.106
Table 3 presents the disparate burdens of the time tax on white,
black, and Hispanic voters. While 40% of white voters did not wait at
all to cast a ballot, only 22% of blacks reported the same. While 9% of
whites waited thirty to sixty minutes to vote, nearly twice as many
blacks, 17%, had to wait that length of time. While only 5% of whites
waited longer than an hour to vote, 15% of blacks bore that burden.
For Hispanic voters, wait times were longer than for whites but shorter
than for blacks. Thirty-three percent of Hispanics did not wait at all to
cast a ballot, 10% waited thirty to sixty minutes, and 8% waited longer
than an hour.
104 See ANSOLABEHERE, supra note 102 (manuscript at 53–54); Telephone Interview
with Stephen Ansolabehere, Professor, Department of Government, Harvard
University (Mar. 12, 2009).
105 Telephone Interview with Stephen Ansolabehere, supra note 104.
106 See infra tbls. 3–5. Before the CCES data was available, others had suggested
that long wait times correlated with the concentration of racial minorities. See, e.g.,
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, THE END OF THE LINE? 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.
advancementproject.org/pdfs/vpp/PollingPlaceResourcesReport.pdf;
VoteBackHome.com, Long Lines at Polling Places (By State), http://votebackhome.
com/longlines (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (concluding “long lines are strongly correlated with race” such that long lines are correlated with a higher concentration of
black voters).

R

R

\\server05\productn\N\NDL\85-1\NDL105.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 21

30-NOV-09

abolishing the time tax on voting

TABLE 3. WAIT TIMES

AT THE

POLLS

IN

2008

7:57

197

BY

RACE

Data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey107
Wait Time at Poll
Not at all
Less than 10 minutes
10 to 30 minutes
31 to 60 minutes
Longer than 60 minutes

Whites
40%
28%
18%
9%
5%

Blacks
22%
23%
23%
17%
15%

Hispanics
33%
27%
22%
10%
8%

Regional differences in wait times are worth noting. Only 2% of
voters in Northeastern and Western states waited longer than an hour
to vote, while 5% of Midwesterners and 11% of Southerners waited
that long. Table 4 reflects the differential wait times faced by those in
the South, compared with those in the Northeast, Midwest, and West.
TABLE 4. WAIT TIMES

AT THE

POLLS

IN

2008

BY

REGION

Data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey108
Wait Time at Poll
Not at all
Less than 10
minutes
10 to 30 minutes
31 to 60 minutes
Longer than 60
minutes

Northeast
42%

Midwest
39%

South
30%

West
44%

34%

27%

25%

27%

15%
7%

19%
10%

21%
13%

18%
8%

2%

5%

11%

2%

In the Midwest, the burden of waiting fell disproportionately on
black voters: while 3.8% of white and 3.9% of Hispanic voters waited
longer than an hour to vote, 18% of blacks waited that long. In the
South, the burden of waiting fell on blacks and to a lesser extent on
Hispanics: 8% of whites waited longer than an hour to vote, while 19%
107 Telephone Interview with Stephen Ansolabehere, supra note 104; E-mail from
Stephen Ansolabehere, Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University to
Author (Mar. 13, 2009 09:24 EST) (on file with author). These data combine the
responses of those who voted at the polls on Election Day and during early in-person
voting.
108 Telephone Interview with Stephen Ansolabehere, supra note 104; E-mail from
Stephen Ansolabehere, supra note 107. These data combine the responses of those
who voted at the polls on Election Day and during early in-person voting.
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of blacks and 14.5% of Hispanics waited that long. Table 5 captures
the regional and racial disparities in wait times in the 2008 election.
TABLE 5. WAIT TIMES

AT THE

POLLS

IN

2008

BY

REGION

AND

RACE

Data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey109
Wait Time
at Poll

Northeast

Midwest

South

West

Not at all

Whites: 44%
Whites: 42%
Whites: 33%
Whites: 48%
Blacks: 32%
Blacks: 22%
Blacks: 18%
Blacks: 31%
Hispanics: 35% Hispanics: 34% Hispanics: 18% Hispanics: 9%

Less than
10 minutes

Whites: 35%
Whites: 27%
Whites: 27%
Whites: 26%
Blacks: 31%
Blacks: 20%
Blacks: 20%
Blacks: 24%
Hispanics: 36% Hispanics: 28% Hispanics: 23% Hispanics: 30%

10 to 30
minutes

Whites: 15%
Whites: 19%
Whites: 20%
Whites: 17%
Blacks: 21%
Blacks: 24%
Blacks: 25%
Blacks: 22%
Hispanics: 18% Hispanics: 27% Hispanics: 23% Hispanics: 20%

31 to 60
minutes

Whites: 5%
Blacks: 13%
Hispanics: 9%

Whites: 9%
Blacks: 17%
Hispanics: 8%

Whites: 12%
Whites: 7%
Blacks: 18%
Blacks: 18%
Hispanics: 14% Hispanics: 8%

Longer than Whites: 2%
60 minutes Blacks: 4%
Hispanics: 3%

Whites: 4%
Blacks: 18%
Hispanics: 4%

Whites: 8%
Whites: 2%
Blacks: 19%
Blacks: 5%
Hispanics: 15% Hispanics: 4%

Unsurprisingly, many voters cannot wait a long time to vote on
Election Day or during early voting. In 2008, hundreds of thousands
of voters were forced to wait not just an hour but five hours or longer
if they wished to cast a ballot.110 According to CCES data, over 8% of
registered voters who did not cast a ballot—several hundreds of
thousands of eligible citizens—tried to vote but could not because of a
“long line at polls.”111 The only available study of this issue prior to
2008 found that the burden of waiting caused more than 129,500
109 E-mail from Stephen Ansolabehere, supra note 107. This data combines the
responses of those who voted at the polls on Election Day and during early in-person
voting. Due to formatting considerations, the percentages listed in Table 5 have been
rounded to the nearest whole number.
110 See Critical Election Infrastructure Act of 2009, H.R. 253, 111th Cong. § 2
(2009); ELECTION PROTECTION, ELECTION PROTECTION 2008 19–20, 22, available at
www.866ourvote.org/tools/documents/files/0077.pdf; Vu, supra note 92; NewsHour
with Jim Lehrer: Voters Encounter Long Lines amid Heavy Turnout (PBS television broadcast Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/julydec08/fessler_11-04.html. For a collection of news reports on long lines during early
voting, see Rachel Maddow Show (MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 2, 2008).
111 Voter Registration Hearing, supra note 103, at 20 (testimony of Ansolabhere).
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Ohio voters—2% of the state’s electorate—to leave the polls without
voting in Ohio in the 2004 general election.112
The data discussed so far do not capture how many voters were so
discouraged by the prospect of long lines that they did not show up to
the polls at all in the 2008 election. According to CCES data, 3% of
registered voters did not even try to cast a ballot because they were
discouraged by a “long line at polls.”113
Polling data from the Marist College Institute for Public Opinion,
presented in Table 6, sheds further light on this issue. Six days before
Election Day 2008, significant numbers of registered voters nationwide expected to wait in long lines before casting their ballots: 35% of
voters believed it was “very likely” and 37% of voters believed it was
“likely” that they would encounter “long lines at [their] polling place
on election day.”114 Nearly 60% of voters reported that they could not
wait “as long as it takes” to cast their ballot.115 Twenty-seven percent
said that “the longest amount of time” that they could wait in line to
vote was thirty minutes or less.116 Seventeen percent reported that
they could wait thirty-one to sixty minutes.117 Fifteen percent said
they could wait more than an hour but not “as long as it takes.”118
These data suggest that 44% of eligible voters expected not to vote on
November 4, 2008 if they faced a line at their polling place longer
than sixty minutes. Polling data from just before the 2004 election
reveal strikingly similar responses.119

112 VOTING RIGHTS INST., DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., DEMOCRACY AT RISK: THE
2004 ELECTION IN OHIO § III, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.democrats.org/a/
2005/06/democracy_at_ri.php.
113 Voter Registration Hearing, supra note 103, at 20 (testimony of Ansolabhere).
114 Press Release, Marist Inst. for Pub. Opinion, The American Electorate: Great
Expectations? (Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Marist Press Release], available at
http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/misc/usapolls/Vote081103.pdf.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Press Release, Marist Inst. for Pub. Opinion, National Poll: Campaign 2004—
Election Eve Results (Nov. 2, 2004), available at http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/misc/usapolls/PZ041102.pdf.
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TABLE 6. “LONGEST AMOUNT OF TIME” VOTERS CAN WAIT
AT THE POLLS, 2004 & 2008
Data from the Marist College Institute for Public Opinion120
Voters who could
wait longer than
Voters who could Voters who could an hour but not Voters who would
wait a maximum
wait 31 to 60
“as long as
wait “as long as
of 30 minutes
minutes
it takes”
it takes”
2004

24%

17%

11%

48%

2008

27%

17%

15%

41%

B. Reasons for Concern
When asked about long lines at the polls on the eve of the 2008
election, Marge Tartaglione, the chairwoman of the Philadelphia Voting Commission, scoffed: “You see people waiting in line” for “baseball tickets,” “ipod[s],” and at “the supermarket”—those “same
people” just need to wait to vote.121 Tartaglione is wrong, of course.
In a society committed to democratic governance, waiting in line to
vote is different than waiting in line for consumer goods. “No right is
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we
must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined.”122 When many citizens are forced to wait on
long lines at the polls such that their right to vote is denied or
abridged, Americans should be concerned. There are at least three
reasons why.
The first is pragmatic. Recent presidential elections have been
decided by a relatively small number of votes. In 2008, two to four
million registered voters—or one percent to two percent of the eligible electorate—were discouraged from voting due to administrative
hassles, including long lines.123 The number of people prevented
from voting in 2008 exceeded the popular vote margin in the previous
two presidential elections.124 In Ohio in 2004, more than 129,500 vot120 For the 2004 data, see id., and for the 2008 data, see 2008 Marist Press Release,
supra note 114.
121 Chaos Looms Over Pennsylvania Vote (American News Project online video Oct.
31, 2008), http://americannewsproject.com/videos/chaos-looms-over-pennsylvaniavote.
122 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
123 Ansolabehere Testimony, supra note 103, at 19.
124 See Ian Urbina, Hurdles to Voting Persisted in 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at
A18.
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ers left the polls because of long lines, and the presidential contest
was decided by a margin of 118,000 ballots.125 Those who arrive at the
polls but are turned away by long lines or who do not come at all
because of long lines can decide the fate of elections, assuming a nonrandom distribution of wait times. Elections should be decided based
on voters’ preferences, not their time constraints.
The second reason centers on electoral access. No voter should
be discouraged from voting by long lines at the polls. An administrative hurdle of this sort simply should not deprive a citizen of the most
precious right to vote. All eligible citizens should have access to the
franchise.
The third reason for concern focuses on disparate burdens. Perhaps if the burden of long lines fell on all Americans equally regardless of race or place of residence, we should be less concerned. But if,
as seems to be the case, the burden of waiting disproportionately falls
on black and Latino voters (especially in the South), it offends our
sense of fundamental fairness. That minority voters, nationwide and
in the South, in 2008 still do not have equal access to the ballot box is
unfair and intolerable.
Given that the time tax is a significant problem and one that
Americans should care about, we should work to mitigate its burden
on the right to vote. The subsequent parts of this Article focus on
reform through the federal judiciary and, more importantly, through
the political process.
III. CHALLENGING

THE

TIME TAX

The Constitution prohibits state and local officials from requiring
voters to wait too long to vote because that would risk turning away a
significant portion of the electorate. The Constitution also prohibits
forcing some voters, especially racial minorities, to wait longer than
others to cast a ballot. But how are such constitutional guarantees to
be enforced when federal courts routinely and strenuously decline to
interfere in state election administration?126
125 See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM. VOTING RIGHTS INST., supra note 112, at 2.
126 See, e.g., Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1985) (denying voters relief because “ordinary dispute over the counting and marking of ballots” is “not
actionable in federal court because of our federal system’s recognition that states are
primarily responsible for regulating their own elections” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1980) (denying voters relief
because “[i]f every state election irregularity were considered a federal constitutional
deprivation, federal courts would adjudicate every state election dispute, and the elaborate state election contest procedures, designed to assure speedy and orderly disposition of the multitudinous questions that may arise in the electoral process, would be
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Until now, it has been assumed that long lines at the polls are
neither an issue of constitutional dimension nor even an issue worth
litigating. No treatise has laid out any framework for challenging a
time tax. One leading election law casebook mentions long lines in
just two sentences and suggests that nothing is to be done about the
problem: “Voters may express concern and even outrage if, for example, tie-ups on election day cause the lines to swell and delays to
mount. But rarely will mere inconvenience attract anything beyond
the most fleeting attention.”127 Another leading election law
casebook mentions long lines in questions buried over three pages
and expresses skepticism about whether the Equal Protection Clause
reaches the problem.128 These cursory mentions of long lines suggest
superseded by a 1983 gloss”); Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 1975)
(denying voters relief because “the work of conducting elections in our society is typically carried on by volunteers and recruits for whom it is at most an avocation and
whose experience and intelligence vary widely” and “[g]iven these conditions, errors
and irregularities . . . are inevitable, and no constitutional guarantee exists to remedy
them”); Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1973)
(denying voters relief because a federal court is not the “arbiter of disputes over
whether particular persons were or were not entitled to vote or over alleged irregularities in the transmission and handling of absentee voter ballots” absent factors such as
denial of the vote based on race or fraud).
The reluctance of federal courts to intervene in the nuts and bolts of election
administration manifests itself in what Christopher Elmendorf calls the “trans-clausal”
doctrinal framework that the Supreme Court uses in constitutional challenges to election laws. The Supreme Court’s analytic framework remains constant whether those
challenges are predicated on the Equal Protection right to vote on equal terms with
others, as in Crawford; or the First Amendment right to associate for political purposes, as in Anderson, as well as Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008), and California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
(2000); or the First Amendment right to engage in political speech, see, e.g., Buckley v.
Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230
(2006); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). The same intuitions also animate due
process decisions that draw a line between fundamental unfairness and garden variety
election irregularities. See discussion infra Part III.B; see also Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624–27 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the burden imposed by state law was minimal); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S.
581, 597–98 (2005) (discussing plaintiffs’ challenge to election laws on First Amendment grounds).
127 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1016 (3d ed. 2007).
128 DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW 312 (2008) (“Suppose that in
one county, the average voter must wait in a ten-minute line in order to vote while, in
a neighboring county, the average voter need only wait in a two-minute line. . . .
Should such disparities trigger strict scrutiny?”); id. at 329–30 (“Should a ‘tax on the
voter’s time’ be considered a severe burden, sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny? If so,
what is the logical stopping point?”).
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that few people realize the extent to which long lines can and actually
do disenfranchise voters.129
Part of this Article’s project is to help judges, litigators, and voters
understand that long lines at the polls are problems of constitutional
dimension and that they are litigable. To this end, this Part suggests
six doctrinal grounds for challenging a time tax: the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment, the TwentyFourth Amendment, and Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
In presenting these grounds, I offer two caveats. First, they are
not the only means of successfully challenging a time tax. Challenges
based on state law have potential130 but a state-by-state analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article. Second, the likelihood of succeeding
in time tax litigation may vary depending on the opportunities to vote
in any given state. In states without no-excuses absentee voting, time
tax litigation may be the most likely to succeed because voters must
cast their ballot on Election Day or not at all. In such states, the
absence of other voting opportunities exacerbates the burden on voters’ rights caused by long lines.131
A. Equal Protection Clause
As discussed in Part I.C, voters succeeded in Cortés on equal protection grounds. While the decision is unique in that it is the only
recorded judicial opinion, state or federal, that ordered a time tax to
be mitigated before an upcoming election in which the plaintiffs
sought to vote, it is not surprising. Rather, the case is a logical outgrowth of Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections132 and one-person,
one-vote doctrine.
In Harper, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a provision of the Virginia Constitution which required payment of an
annual poll tax of $1.50, the proceeds of which supported public
schools and other public purposes. The Court declined to consider
whether the poll tax, “born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro,”
served that same invidious end in 1966.133 Instead the Court held that
129 But see SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY 42–46 (2006) (discussing disparities in wait times at the polls in Ohio in 2004 election).
130 See, e.g., In re 1984 Gen. Election for Office of Council of Twp. of Maple Shade,
497 A.2d 577, 592 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (invalidating election results and
ordering new election where no voting machine was available for three-and-a-half
hours on Election Day, causing unreasonable delays in voting and voter
disenfranchisement).
131 See discussion infra Part V.
132 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
133 Id. at 666 n.3.
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“a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment
of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation
to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax.”134 The
Court could not have been clearer: the Constitution bars a “system
which excludes those unable to pay a fee to vote or who fail to pay. . . .
To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s
qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The
degree of the discrimination is irrelevant.”135
In so ruling, the Court overturned Breedlove v. Suttles,136 which
had held that a poll tax was not repugnant to the Equal Protection
Clause.137 To explain the dramatic doctrinal change, the Harper
Court stated: “[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the
political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are
unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality . . . . Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.”138
It is hardly a leap to apply Harper’s evolving theory of the Equal
Protection Clause to long lines at the polls today. Underlying Harper
is concern that one’s monetary status (or lack thereof) should not preclude a citizen from casting a ballot. Just as a poll tax disenfranchises
voters who cannot afford to pay in dollars, so too do long lines disenfranchise those who cannot afford to pay in time. It is plausible that
when faced with long lines, the working poor are more likely to leave
the polls without casting a ballot than the wealthy, due in part to
inflexible work schedules, child care obligations, and other responsibilities that they alone must shoulder.139 Harper forbids this. To the
extent that paying in time to vote is “a measure of a voter’s qualifica-

134 Id. at 666.
135 Id. at 668.
136 302 U.S. 277 (1937); see also Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937 (1951) (summarily affirming denial of challenge to Virginia poll tax).
137 Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 281. When the Justices first considered Harper at conference, they voted 6 to 3 to uphold Breedlove, not overturn it. The Justices reconsidered
their position after Justice Arthur Goldberg circulated a dissenting opinion that relied
on the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing
the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 112
(2009); Bernard Schwartz, More Unpublished Warren Court Opinions, 1986 SUP. CT. REV.
317, 320–21; discussion infra Part III.D.
138 Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.
139 Assessing this question empirically is beyond the scope of this Article.
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tions,” it is “capricious” and “irrelevant.”140 A “system” that excludes
those unable or unwilling to pay in time to vote is unconstitutional.141
At what point might waiting in line to vote result in a constitutional violation? One reading of Harper might suggest that the Constitution forbids paying any time tax as a prerequisite to voting. Just as a
$1.50 poll tax was unconstitutional, so too would be a 25¢ poll tax or a
1¢ poll tax.142 Likewise, just as an hour’s wait offends the Constitution, so too does a fifteen minute wait or a five minute wait.143
While this reasoning may have theoretical appeal, it is unworkable in practice on Election Day. In Cortés, the court rejected the
notion that a wait time becomes unconstitutional after a certain minute. “There is no bright line or ‘litmus-paper test.’”144 “Some waiting
in line . . . is inevitable and must be expected.”145 “Nonetheless, there
can come a point when the burden of standing in a queue ceases to be
an inconvenience or annoyance and becomes a constitutional violation because it, in effect, denies a person the right to exercise his or
her franchise.”146
Here Harper might provide some guidance. If we adjust Virginia’s 1966 poll tax for inflation, we can calculate how much lost
wages Harper might deem constitutionally impermissible for a voter
waiting in line to cast a ballot in November 2008. Virginia’s $1.50 poll
tax in 1966 is the equivalent of $9.97 in 2008.147 A citizen earning the
federal minimum wage of $6.55 in November 2008148 would be
required to forgo income from just over ninety minutes of work (in
pre-tax dollars) if such a poll tax were imposed today. Alternatively,
we can place the $1.50 poll tax in the context of wages in 1966. A
worker in 1966 earning the then-federal minimum wage of $1.25149
140 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See Michael Churchill, Philadelphia Federal Court Acts to Prevent Constitutional
Problems from Election Day Delays, UPON FURTHER REV., Mar. 9, 2009, http://uponfurtherreview.philadelphiabar.org/page/Article?articleID=2a7fe01f-e535-4558-bcff-524b
9c907ea1.
144 NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764 (E.D. Pa.
2008) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 400 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
148 EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE
RATES UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 1938–2009 (2009), http://www.dol.
gov/esa/minwage/chart.pdf.
149 Id.
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would have to forgo earnings from seventy-two minutes of work to pay
Virginia’s poll tax (in pre-tax dollars). By these measures, an extension of Harper suggests that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a state
from requiring a voter earning today’s federal minimum wage to
forego earnings from seventy-two or ninety minutes of income as a
prerequisite of voting.
There are certainly limits to applying a Supreme Court case from
more than forty years ago simply by adjusting for inflation or wage
increases. But this type of analysis might be persuasive to several
members of the Supreme Court. In his dissenting opinion in Crawford, Justice Souter explained that making voters travel to the Bureau
of Motor Vehicles to obtain photo identification “translates into an
obvious economic cost” “in work time lost.”150 Likewise, Justice Breyer
adjusts the 1966 Virginia poll tax for inflation in discussing the burdens that Harper forbids today.151
One-person, one-vote doctrine offers another equal protection
rationale for mitigating the time tax.152 The weight of one’s vote cannot be diminished or denied based on where one lives. “A citizen, a
qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or
on the farm.”153 If data show that a state policy “discriminates against
the residents of the populous counties of the State in favor of rural
sections,” by producing long lines at the polls in the former but not
the latter, for example, the policies “lack[ ] the equality to which the
exercise of political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment.”154 To make out such a claim successfully, empirical evidence
on the differential wait times is critical to show that the principle of
“one person, one vote”155 is being undermined by nonrandomly distributed long lines.156
150 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1630 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
151 Id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
152 See, e.g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969) (“The idea that one group
can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one
vote basis of our representative government.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566
(1964) (holding that “[d]iluting the weight of votes because of place of residence
impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment”); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (holding that each voter’s vote is entitled to be counted
once and to be protected from dilution).
153 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568; see also Gray, 372 U.S. at 379 (“[A]ll who participate in
the election are to have an equal vote . . . wherever their home may be . . . .”).
154 Moore, 394 U.S. at 819.
155 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (quoting Gray, 372 U.S. at 381).
156 Cf. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2004 SURVEY, supra note 95, at 12-5
(concluding that “[s]mall, rural jurisdictions and large, urban jurisdictions tended to
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Harper and one-person, one-vote doctrine show that Cortés is not
an aberration in equal protection doctrine. For more than a century,
from Yick Wo v. Hopkins157 to Bush v. Gore,158 it has been recognized
that the right to vote is fundamental. Indeed, in Bush, the Supreme
Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause in protecting the exercise
of the right to vote: “The right to vote is protected in more than the
initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to
the manner of its exercise.”159 In considering a recent challenge to
unreliable voting equipment, a Sixth Circuit panel said that
“[v]iolations of the Equal Protection Clause are no less deserving of
protection because they are accomplished with a modern machine
than with outdated prejudices.”160 Similarly, such violations are no
less deserving of protection because they are accomplished by long
lines rather than poll taxes.
The Supreme Court has instructed federal courts on when to
apply strict scrutiny versus a balancing test for examining stateimposed burdens on the right to vote.161 Where the burden on the
right to vote is “‘severe,’” a court should apply strict scrutiny and the
challenged law must be “‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance.’”162 Where, instead, a state election law
“imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” on voters’
rights, a court should apply a balancing test that weighs “‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights’ . . . against ‘the
precise interests put forward by the State’ . . . , taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden
the plaintiff’s rights.’”163
When plaintiffs can prove that a state policy’s effect is long lines
at the polls that impose severe or discriminatory burdens, the approreport higher rates of inadequate [numbers of] poll workers within polling places or
precincts”—a factor that could contribute to long lines).
157 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (noting, in dicta, that voting “is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”).
158 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (“When the state legislature vests the
right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental.”).
159 Id. Some argue that Bush v. Gore is the first Supreme Court case applying
equal protection analysis to the “nuts and bolts” of election administration. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 128, at 299.
160 Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 880 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds
by 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007).
161 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992) (discussing when the two
tests should be applied).
162 Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
163 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
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priate standard of review is strict scrutiny.164 More frequently, federal
courts apply a balancing test in analyzing nuts-and-bolts voter access
cases,165 and Judge Bartle did so in Cortés.166 In the context of such a
balancing test, it may be difficult for a state to justify policies that tolerate voting machine failures or overcrowded precincts which cause
lines so long that many voters are turned away.
Under a balancing test, a state policy lacks constitutional validity
when its effects target the exercise of political rights of an “identifiable” group.167 The effect of a state policy that produces long lines
may particularly target blacks, Latinos, the poor, the elderly, and
those physically unable to wait for long periods of time.168 During the
hearing for Cortés, Judge Bartle expressed concern that, while the time
tax may not burden those privileged enough to “take an hour off”
164 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969) (applying “exacting examination” in evaluating why “some . . . citizens are permitted to participate
and some are not.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 562 (1964) (“[A]ny alleged
infringement on the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”); O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531–35 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“ ‘[T]he Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest.’ It is this standard which must be employed here.” (citations omitted) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972))). In this analysis, the intent of the state policy is irrelevant. Cf. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 666 n.3 (1966) (stating that invidious intent is irrelevant in assessing constitutionality of poll tax).
165 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 316–17 (2007). It is worth noting that five Justices in Crawford endorsed the Anderson and Burdick balancing tests.
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
with Roberts, C.J. and Kennedy, J.); id. at 1628, 1635–36 (Souter, J., dissenting, with
Ginsburg, J.). Three Justices endorsed only Burdick. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring, with Thomas, J. and Alito, J.). Justice Breyer endorsed neither. Id. at 1643–45
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (endorsing a balancing test that balances whether a statute’s
burdens on some outweigh the statute’s salutary effects on others).
166 See discussion supra Part I.C.
167 See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 (“[I]t is especially difficult for the State to justify a
restriction that limits political participation by an identifiable political group whose
members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic
status.”).
168 Similarly, in Crawford, Justice Souter found it troubling that “the travel costs
and the fees” required to obtain photo identification “are disproportionately heavy
for, and thus disproportionately likely to deter, the poor, the old, and the immobile.”
128 S. Ct. at 1631 (Souter, J., dissenting). In striking down Georgia’s 2005 photo
identification law as unconstitutional, one court explained that for these types of vulnerable groups of individuals, “the loss of their right to vote . . . is undeniably demoralizing and extreme, as those citizens are likely to have no other realistic or effective
means of protecting their rights.” Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp.
2d 1326, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
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from work, it especially burdens those “punching a time clock” and
those who “have a supervisor [saying] [you]’ve got to be on the assembly line”169—i.e., those workers most in need of income and with the
least job security.170
One interest the Commonwealth did not raise in Cortés is cost.
The Commonwealth could not raise that defense because the relief
sought by the plaintiffs required only a minor expense, the expenditure of photocopying costs for additional emergency paper ballots.
Elsewhere, however, the specter of expenses associated with election
administration is likely to be raised in defense of a state policy that
produces long lines: we cannot afford more voting machines or more
poll workers or more polling places. Fiscal excuses of this kind are
insufficient for denying a fundamental right,171 particularly when
there is a relatively low-cost means of ensuring the right, such as the
distribution of paper ballots.
Finally, it is worth noting that Cortés is not the only case recognizing that long lines can violate citizens’ federal constitutional right to
vote. In one other federal case, Ury v. Santee,172 a court concluded
that long lines unreasonably restricted access to the ballot box in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.173 Unlike in Cortés, the violation in Ury was found post-election and a new election was ordered.174

169 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 356.
170 This is not to say that the time tax does not burden others as well. Judge Bartle
expressed concern about the effects of long lines on “teacher[s] in school [who] can’t
just take off and leave the kids at school” and “business person[s]” whose responsibilities permit only limited time for voting. Id. Yet, it may be that hourly workers earning the federal minimum wage (or less) are more likely to value and need each extra
dollar of earnings compared with those at higher income levels.
171 Consider, for example, the indigent criminal defendant’s fundamental right to
counsel. No court would tolerate a state’s refusal to bear the expense of providing
such a defendant with counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45
(1963); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants have right to counsel on appeal). In the voting rights context, fiscal
excuses have been rejected as insufficient to deny the fundamental right to vote. See,
e.g., Duncan v. Poythress, 515 F. Supp. 327, 342 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (“The cost to the
state of holding [a new] election certainly is, or should be, a matter of concern for all
citizens of this state; nevertheless, it is not a sufficiently compelling reason to deny
[the] plaintiffs the relief they seek. The restoration of the plaintiffs’ right to vote
outweighs the public expenditure involved.”), aff’d 657 F.2d 691, 708 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981); Ury v. Santee, 303 F. Supp. 119, 127 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (same).
172 303 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
173 Id. at 126.
174 Id. at 127.
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At issue in Ury were the procedures implemented by local officials
for the election of four members of a seven-person Village Board.175
Voters brought a class action suit to challenge the decision of local
officials to consolidate thirty-two voting precincts into six voting precincts for the election.176 The consolidation “forced [voters] to wait
unreasonable lengths of time to obtain and cast their ballots in certain
of the precincts.”177 Wait times ranged from two to four hours and
“hundreds of voters were effectively deprived of their right to vote.”178
The plaintiffs contended that these wait times violated their rights.179
The court agreed:
It was the duty of defendants as the responsible officers and
trustees of the Village of Wilmette to provide adequate and substantially equal voting facilities to the citizens of Wilmette. . . .
As a consequence of the failure of defendants to provide substantially equal voting facilities, the plaintiffs and those similarly situated were discriminated against in the exercise of their franchise
and were denied the right secured by the United States Constitution
to equal protection of the laws.
....
United States citizens do have a right guaranteed by the Constitution to a reasonable opportunity to vote in local elections, that is,
to be given reasonable access to the voting place, to be able to vote
within a reasonable time . . . .180

The court determined that “[t]he injury suffered by the plaintiffs
and other citizens similarly situated . . . would far outweigh the cost of
conducting a fair, proper and valid election.”181 It voided the flawed
election and ordered a new one “at the earliest possible date.”182
B. Due Process Clause
A claim based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment should be included in any challenge to the time tax.
Although no case has explicitly held that the Due Process Clause prohibits long lines at the polls, a logical extension of substantive due
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 125.
at 126.
at 124.
id. at 121.
at 126.
at 127.
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process doctrine protects voters against disenfranchisement by unduly
burdensome wait times.
The Constitution protects citizens’ fundamental right to vote and
to have their votes counted by way of election procedures that are
fundamentally fair.183 The touchstone of due process analysis is “fundamental fairness”—that state officials cannot conduct an election in
a manner so flawed as to amount to a denial of voters’ rights to cast a
ballot. Where “organic failures in a state or local election process
threaten to work patent and fundamental unfairness, a . . . claim lies
for a violation of substantive due process.”184 Organic failures include
“across-the-board disenfranchisement” that signal a “breakdown of the
electoral process.”185 This is an “extraordinary circumstance,” more
sweeping in degree than garden variety election irregularities.186
In the seminal case Griffin v. Burns,187 the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit explained when federal courts should act to prevent a
violation of due process in the context of election irregularities:
[Federal courts have properly intervened when] the attack was,
broadly, upon the fairness of the official terms and procedures
under which the election was conducted. The federal courts were
not asked to count and validate ballots and enter into the details of
the administration of the election. Rather they were confronted
with an officially-sponsored election procedure which, in its basic
aspect, was flawed. Due process, “representing a profound attitude
of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between
individual and government,” . . . is implicated in such a situation.188
183 See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915); Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d
1065, 1076 (1st Cir. 1978).
184 Bonas v. Town of N. Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Siegel v.
LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1187 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that a federally protected right
is implicated “where the entire election process—including as part thereof the state’s
administrative and judicial corrective process—fails on its face to afford fundamental
fairness”(citations omitted)); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 888 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a substantive due process violation exists where there is a “broad-gauged
unfairness” that infects the results of an election); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691,
700 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he due process clause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
prohibits action by state officials which seriously undermine [sic] the fundamental
fairness of the electoral process.”); Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir.
1978) (“If the election process itself reaches the point of patent and fundamental
unfairness, a violation of the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause may be indicated and relief
under § 1983 therefore in order.”).
185 Bonas, 265 F.3d at 75.
186 Id.
187 570 F.2d at 1065.
188 Id. at 1078 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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A state policy that produces long lines at the polls—say, lines
longer than sixty minutes that put more than forty percent of voters at
risk of being turned away—is flawed. To the extent that such lines are
not justified by a weighty governmental interest, such a policy is
unconstitutional. The Due Process Clause protects against precisely
this type of arbitrariness. Faced with a state policy that is likely to
create long lines and thereby disenfranchise voters, “a federal judge
need not be timid, but may and should do what common sense and
justice require.”189
C. First Amendment
The First Amendment may prove to be a useful tool in challenging the time tax. Although the right to vote is not typically analyzed
through a First Amendment framework, there is an undeniable link
between the First Amendment and political participation. The
Supreme Court recognized this link in Harper, but declined to elaborate on it:
It is argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit, particularly by reason of the First Amendment and that it may not constitutionally be conditioned upon the payment of a tax or fee. We do
not stop to canvass the relation between voting and political expression. For it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to
the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.190

From there, Harper proceeded with an equal protection analysis,
and many subsequent cases have followed suit.191
While the connection between political participation and the
First Amendment may be undertheorized,192 a challenge to the time
tax can be made out on First Amendment grounds. The right to vote
189 Id.
190 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (internal citations
omitted).
191 See discussion supra Part III.A.
192 According to Daniel Tokaji, the Harper Court’s decision not to delve into First
Amendment analysis has “hindered the recognition of the links between the First
Amendment and the principle of equal participation.” Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409,
2495–96 (2003). Tokaji urges recognition of the connections between the two doctrinal areas. Id. at 2498. Others have suggested that it is unnecessary and possibly
unwise to use the First Amendment as a textual basis for the constitutional right to
vote. See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 338–40 (1993).
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has been analogized to “having a voice,” i.e., speech, in an election.193
Elsewhere, the right to vote has been linked to the right to associate:
“[T]he right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters . . . to cast their votes
effectively . . . rank among our most precious freedoms.”194 Both the
right to speak and the right to associate, in the context of voting or
otherwise, are at the heart of the First Amendment.195
Perhaps the connection between the right to vote and the First
Amendment is strongest in the context of ballot access cases. Courts
have struck down state parties’ ballot access schemes in primary elections where they “pose[ ] an undue burden in [their] totality on the
right to vote under the First Amendment.”196 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has recognized that “[t]he exclusion of candidates [from the
ballot] . . . burdens voters’ freedom of association, because an election
campaign is an effective platform for the expression of views on the
issues of the day, and a candidate serves as a rallying point for likeminded citizens.”197 Just as excluding candidates from the ballot “burdens voters’ freedom of association,”198 so too does the exclusion of
actual voters for a candidate. Just as “[t]he right to form a party for
the advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept
off the election ballot,”199 the right of a party to be on the ballot
means little if voters cannot cast a ballot for that party. In the former
scenario, the voter cannot associate with the party because the party is
not on the ballot. In the latter, the voter cannot associate with the
party because a voter cannot get to the ballot box. In both scenarios,
193 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a
free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live.”).
194 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); see also Cal. Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) (“[T]he First Amendment protects ‘the freedom to
join together in furtherance of common political beliefs . . . .’ ” (quoting Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214–15 (1986))).
195 The rights to speak and associate freely have also been protected under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 57
U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is beyond debate that the freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech.”).
196 Molinari v. Powers, 82 F. Supp. 2d 57, 71–78 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing comparable cases).
197 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1983).
198 Id.
199 Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
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the voter’s right to associate with a candidate and to have a voice in
the election is not only burdened, but eviscerated.
Notwithstanding the appeal of the First Amendment as grounds
for challenging a time tax, a litigator may wish to proceed with some
caution in raising this claim. Thus far, the First Amendment generally
has not been a successful ground for voter access litigation.200
D. Twenty-Fourth Amendment
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment is a potentially important means
of challenging the time tax, although it has never before been raised
in time tax litigation. Often forgotten and overlooked, the Amendment marked a critical achievement in voting rights,201 banning the
poll tax and any other tax that “denie[s] or abridge[s]” the right to
vote in federal elections.202
Challenges brought by voters under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment are rare indeed. The first and only Supreme Court opinion to
discuss the Amendment at any length is Harman v. Forssenius.203 At
issue in Harman was a Virginia law imposing burdensome annual reregistration requirements on Virginians who wished to vote in federal
elections without paying a poll tax.204 Developed in 1963 in anticipation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment,205 the law required a voter
who wished to avoid paying a poll tax to file a witnessed or notarized
certificate of residence no earlier than October 1 of the year immediately preceding that in which the voter desired to vote and not later
than six months prior to the election.206 If a voter failed to file the
certificate and was unable or unwilling to pay the poll tax, she could
not vote.207
200 See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 Civ. 8586, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10863, at
*19–20 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004) (holding that First Amendment is not a basis for
enfranchising those convicted of felonies and collecting cases), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part by 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc).
201 For a history of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, see Ackerman & Nou, supra
note 137, at 69–87.
202 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to
vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for
President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any
poll tax or other tax.”).
203 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
204 Id. at 529.
205 Id. at 531.
206 Id. at 531–32.
207 Id. at 532.
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The Supreme Court struck down the Virginia law on TwentyFourth Amendment grounds. “For federal elections, the poll tax is
abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and no equivalent or
milder substitute may be imposed.”208 Virginia’s interest in requiring
voters to prove their residence was inadequate to justify the burden on
the right to vote.209 “[C]onstitutional deprivations may not be justified by some remote administrative benefit to the State.”210 The
Court instructed that the text of the Amendment must be taken
seriously:
[T]he Twenty-fourth Amendment does not merely insure that the
franchise shall not be “denied” by reason of failure to pay the poll
tax; it expressly guarantees that the right to vote shall not be
“denied or abridged” for that reason. Thus, like the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Twenty-fourth “nullifies sophisticated as well as
simple-minded modes” of impairing the right guaranteed. “It hits
onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by those claiming the constitutional
immunity.”211

Harman’s reasoning applies equally to long lines at the polls that
disenfranchise voters.212 The right to vote is “‘of little value if [it]
could be . . . indirectly denied,’ or ‘manipulated out of existence’”213
by long wait times at the polls. Any “remote administrative benefit to
the State” in having voters wait in long lines is inadequate to justify
disenfranchisement.214 Like filing a certificate of residence, waiting
in line to vote can be an “onerous procedural requirement[ ] which
effectively handicap[s] exercise of the franchise.”215 To the extent
that a long line is a “milder substitute” for the poll tax, the TwentyFourth Amendment forbids it: “no equivalent or milder substitute [of
the poll tax] may be imposed.”216
If the precedential weight of Harman is not enough to challenge
a time tax, the plain text of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment is helpful:
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote . . . shall not be
208 Id. at 542.
209 Id. at 543.
210 Id. at 542.
211 Id. at 540–41 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
212 Cf. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 137, at 138–46 (discussing the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment’s applicability to voter identification law at issue in Crawford).
213 Harman, 380 U.S. at 540 (omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
first Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944), then Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 345 (1960)).
214 Id. at 542.
215 Id. at 541.
216 Id. at 542.

R

\\server05\productn\N\NDL\85-1\NDL105.txt

216

unknown

Seq: 40

notre dame law review

30-NOV-09

7:57

[vol. 85:1

denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any . . . other tax.”217 The phrase “other tax” was not a mere
afterthought, but critical to the amendment and much debated.218
William L. Higgs, a Mississippi lawyer, testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary about the disenfranchising effects of the poll
tax in his state. He explained that the “other tax” language was necessary to the amendment because “[t]he State legislature moves very fast
in this area—I think far faster than [Congress] can move—and it is
very dedicated to denying the Negro the right to vote.”219 If the poll
tax were prohibited, Higgs explained, Mississippi would enact myriad
other taxes to disenfranchise black citizens.220
The House was persuaded. The House Committee Report on the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment explains that the prohibition on any
“other tax” is necessary to “prevent both the United States and any
State from setting up any substitute tax in lieu of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting. . . . This prevents the nullification of the amendment’s effect by a resort to subterfuge in the form of other types of
taxes.”221 The substitute taxes explicitly considered by the House
Committee on the Judiciary included the property tax, the real estate
tax, the ad valorem tax, and the automobile tax—the payment of
which a state might make a prerequisite to voting in the absence of
the “other tax” language.222
Admittedly, a “time tax” was not mentioned on the floors of Congress. But the “other tax” language can certainly be read to cover a
tax on a voter’s time. For many Americans, time spent waiting in line
to vote is like paying a tax to the state in the form of lost wages, and a
burdensome time tax can “den[y] or abridge[ ]” the right to vote. As
Bruce Ackerman has noted, waiting in line is an in-kind burden comparable to the required rendition of services, which has traditionally
been understood as a tax.223
217 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
218 See, e.g., Abolition of Poll Tax in Federal Elections: Hearing on H.R. 404, 425, 434,
594, 601, 632, 655, 663, 670, and S. 29 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.
19–20 (1962) [hereinafter Poll Tax Hearings] (statements of Reps. Henry B. Gonzalez
& Byron G. Rogers); id. at 25 (statement of Sen. Holland); id. at 50–52 (statement of
William L. Higgs, Att’y).
219 See Poll Tax Hearings, supra note 218, at 51 (statement of William L. Higgs).
220 Id. at 51–52.
221 H.R. REP. NO. 87-1821, at 5 (1962) (emphasis added).
222 See Poll Tax Hearings, supra note 218, at 51 (statement of William L. Higgs).
223 Posting of Bruce Ackerman, bruce.ackerman@yale.edu, to election-law@mail
man.lls.edu (Dec. 3, 2008, 10:54:12 PST) (archived at http://mailman.lls.edu/piper
mail/election-law/2008-December/017982.html).
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As a whole, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment sought to ensure that
all citizens could cast a ballot in federal elections, regardless of wealth
or state of residence. Explained Senator Spessard Holland of Florida,
the Amendment’s leading sponsor, “[the Amendment] will operate in
favor of colored people and of white people, in favor of people of all
colors, religions, and creeds.”224 Holland emphasized that his concern was economic, not racial, discrimination: “[T]he proposal does
not come under the ordinary classification of the ordinary civil rights
legislation. It applies to majorities, to minorities, and to every person
of every color. It attempts to give to people who otherwise qualify the
right to cast their votes for elected federal officials.”225
In 1962, when Holland introduced the Amendment on the Senate floor,226 five Southern states—Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi,
Texas, and Virginia—continued to impose a poll tax as a condition of
voting.227 Proponents of the amendment sought to guarantee “equality” in citizens’ access to the ballot box.228 In Holland’s view it was
intolerable that a poll tax disenfranchised poor Alabamians while
neighboring Floridians could vote freely.229 After the amendment
passed the Senate and the House, it was ratified by thirty-eight states
in seventeen months and rejected only by Mississippi.230 With respect
to access to the franchise, the American people would tolerate nothing less than “a straitjacket”231 on states to ensure that no eligible
224 108 CONG. REC. 2851, 4154 (1962).
225 Id. Holland was motivated to sweep away the poll tax because it was a barrier
to voting for poor whites who would support the Democratic Party. See Ackerman &
Nou, supra note 137, at 73 (describing Holland as a “proud racist”).
226 Interestingly, the Amendment was introduced in the Senate as an amendment
to a resolution to make Alexander Hamilton’s house a national monument. Holland
designed this maneuver to overcome opponents who had seven times before defeated
the amendment. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 80–81 (Comm. Print 1985)
[hereinafter AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION]; Ackerman & Nou, supra note 137,
at 81.
227 H.R. REP. NO. 87-1821, at 3 (1962); 108 CONG. REC. 2851, 4151 (1962).
228 108 CONG. REC. 2851, 4153 (1962).
229 Id. Opponents of the amendment such as Senator Richard Russell, Jr. of Georgia, claimed that a poll tax “does not really prevent anyone from voting.” Id. at 4153.
These claims were demonstrably wrong. The “five States which still require[d] payment of a poll tax were among the seven States with the lowest voter participation in
the 1960 presidential election.” H.R. REP. NO. 87-1821, at 3 (1962). Where a poll tax
had been abandoned, voter participation increased. Id.
230 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 226, at 81–82.
231 108 CONG. REC. 4152 (1962) (statement of Sen. Russell) (likening the amendment to abolish poll taxes to a previously rejected amendment to establish a national
voting age of 18).
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voter would be disenfranchised based on inability to pay a “poll tax or
other tax.”232
The concerns animating the Twenty-Fourth Amendment apply
equally to the time tax. Like the poll taxes at issue in the early 1960s,
the time tax disproportionately burdens the poor and those in certain
Southern states. Just as Americans in the 1960s believed that all citizens should have equal access to polls regardless of their ability to pay,
we believe the same today. Equal access to the polls for eligible voters
has become ingrained in our national ethos.
The text of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, its legislative history,
and the precedential weight of Harman suggest that the TwentyFourth Amendment should be grounds for challenging a time tax. A
caveat is necessary: litigating a time tax under this Amendment
requires overcoming certain doctrinal obstacles. In the wake of
Harman, few challenges outside the scope of what has been described
as an “explicit and unambiguous poll tax” have succeeded on TwentyFourth Amendment grounds.233 But it is possible for voters seeking
access to the polls to win on such a claim. Recently, a district court
invalidated Georgia’s 2005 voter identification law for running afoul
of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.234 This case shows that part of the
civil rights project of our generation should be to understand and
value the broad reach of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in contexts
outside an “explicit and unambiguous poll tax.”235
232 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
233 See Johnson v. Bredesen, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1056 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (holding that a statute requiring convicted felons to pay court-ordered restitution before
having their voting rights restored was not inconsistent with Twenty-Fourth Amendment); see also Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a statute requiring proof of citizenship for first-time voter registration and identification at polls was not inconsistent with Twenty-Fourth Amendment); Howard v.
Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (holding that
requiring a convicted felon to pay a fee to restore his right to vote did not violate the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment); Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1343 (S.D. Fla.
2002) (same), aff’d on other grounds, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
234 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1366–70 (N.D. Ga.
2005) (holding that Georgia’s photo identification requirement violates the TwentyFourth Amendment with respect to federal elections and violates the Equal Protection Clause with respect to state and municipal elections); see also Bynum v. Conn.
Comm’n on Forfeited Rights, 410 F.2d 173, 177 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that there
was a “substantial issue” as to whether requiring indigent felons to pay five dollars to
regain the right to vote violates the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and remanding for
consideration by three-judge court).
235 See Ackerman & Nou, supra note 137, at 148 (noting “[i]t is time for a new
generation of lawyers to give legal expression [to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment]”).
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E. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
In addition to constitutional bases for challenging the time tax,
there are also statutory options, such as Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. Section 2 prohibits the use of any electoral practice or procedure
that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color.”236 It affords
sweeping protection to “all action necessary to make a vote effective,”
including any “action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a
ballot, and having such ballot counted properly.”237 An electoral
practice or procedure violates Section 2
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to . . . election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
[protected] citizens . . . in that [they] have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.238

Under Section 2, plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent but
only discriminatory impact,239 and the provision “should be interpreted in a manner that provides ‘the broadest possible scope’ in
combating racial discrimination.”240
Where state or local policies or practices disproportionately produce long lines in precincts with higher than average concentrations
of minorities, a Section 2 claim may be viable. In considering whether
to litigate such a claim, it is important to assess the empirical evidence
supporting the claim. For obvious reasons, an ideal challenge would
include data showing vastly different wait times in overwhelmingly
white precincts compared with overwhelmingly minority precincts
accompanied by depressed numbers of ballots cast in the latter
precincts.
In the somewhat similar context of challenges to voting machine
technology, Section 2 challenges have met with some success when
the plaintiffs bolstered their claims of “a denial or abridgment” on
account of race with empirical support.241 For example, in Black v.
236 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
237 Id. § 1973l(c)(1).
238 Id. § 1973(b).
239 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).
240 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
241 See, e.g., Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 896 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Common Cause S. Christian Leadership Conference of Greater L.A. v. Jones, 213 F. Supp.
2d 1106, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Section 2 challenges bolstered by empirical evidence
also have met with limited success in the context of felon disenfranchisement laws. In
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McGuffage,242 the plaintiffs brought a Section 2 challenge alleging that
voting technology used in predominately black and Latino precincts
caused higher error rates and greater risk that minority ballots would
not be counted.243 In denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, the
court considered, among many factors, the likelihood of error rates in
Chicago (white population of about forty-two percent)244 compared
with that of nearby McHenry County (white population greater than
ninety-five percent).245 The court found the comparison rather
shocking: “In the 2000 Presidential race, the probability of an
uncounted vote was twenty-two times greater in Chicago, which used
one of the challenged voting systems, than in McHenry County, which
did not.”246
McGuffage suggests that a court may find empirical evidence supporting a Section 2 claim against a time tax persuasive if the evidence
demonstrates that the wait time in a majority-minority precinct is far
greater than in an overwhelmingly white precinct. As the aggregate
data discussed in Part II reveals, black and Latino voters nationwide
generally wait significantly longer than their white counterparts to
vote. Where state- or local-level data reveal significant disparities in
wait times by race, a Section 2 claim is likely to be viable. The more
stark the disparity, the greater the likelihood of success on the claim.
F. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act offers a possibility for mitigating a time tax before it is assessed. In covered jurisdictions, Section 5
applies to “[a]ny voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or stanFarrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that evidence of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, considered under the totality of the circumstances, could be sufficient for a state
law requiring felon disenfranchisement to be invalidated on Section 2 grounds. Id. at
1016. But see Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
Section 2 does not reach New York’s felon disenfranchisement statute); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259–61 (6th Cir. 1986) (assuming that Section 2 applies to felon
disenfranchisement laws but holding there was no violation); see also Farrakhan v.
Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1120–25 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinksi, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Section 2 does not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws).
242 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
243 Id. at 891–92.
244 U.S. Census Bureau, Illinois QuickFacts: Chicago, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
245 U.S. Census Bureau, Illinois QuickFacts: McHenry County, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17111.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
246 McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
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dard, practice or procedure with respect to voting.”247 To prevent
changes that have a discriminatory purpose or effect, Section 5
requires covered jurisdictions to obtain either judicial preclearance
from a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia or administrative preclearance from the Attorney General
before implementing a voting change.248 “Such preclearance is
granted only if the change neither ‘has the purpose nor will have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color.’”249 Where voting changes have not been precleared, voters
may obtain a federal injunction prohibiting them.250
In the context of the time tax, a Section 5 claim may be viable in
a covered jurisdiction if a new state policy is likely to produce disproportionately long lines in precincts with higher than average minority
populations. Such a policy can take many forms. For example, if new
state policies allow counties to utilize voting technologies that have
varying error and breakdown rates or permit nonuniformity with
regard to the number of voters who may vote on a given voting
machine, the likely result is longer lines at some polls compared with
others. If the burden falls disproportionately on minority voters, such
a policy should not be precleared.
In this analysis, politics might matter. According to the Department of Justice, “[w]ell over ninety-nine percent of the changes affecting voting are reviewed administratively,” rather than by judicial
preclearance.251 Annually, the Department receives between 4500
and 5500 submissions for administrative preclearance under Section
5, which require review of between 14,000 and 20,000 voting
changes.252 It remains to be seen whether the Department under
Barack Obama’s Administration will scrutinize administrative
preclearance petitions with greater care than the previous administra247 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006). Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act defines covered jurisdictions. See id. § 1973b(b).
248 Id. § 1973c; see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
2504, 2509 (2009) (discussing the criteria a jurisdiction must meet to obtain a
favorable judgment from a district court or the Attorney General).
249 Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2509 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
250 See, e.g., Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1991) (holding that Louisiana
should have been enjoined from conducting judicial elections that constituted
changes in voting practices and procedures and were not properly precleared by a
three-judge panel or the attorney general); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 554–57 (1969) (recognizing private right of action to seek injunctive relief
against a Section 5 violation).
251 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, http://www.
usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/about.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
252 Id.
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tion. If it does, the Department may become more wary of the disenfranchising effects of long lines. For this reason alone, it is important
to raise awareness of the extent to which the time tax disenfranchises
voters.
IV. MODEL

FOR

VOTER ACCESS LITIGATION

This Part builds a model for voter access litigation based on the
success of Cortés. The lessons offered here apply specifically to challenges to long lines but also extend to other challenges to “electoral
mechanics”—state-mandated procedures for registration, voting, and
vote-counting—the so-called “nuts and bolts of elections.”253 I share
these lessons with the caveat that resort to the federal courts should be
used as a last-ditch effort to guarantee access to the franchise or as
one part of a multipronged political strategy because, as discussed in
Part V, the political process—not the courts—offers the greatest
potential for ensuring that voters can actually cast ballots.
A. Exhausting the Political Process
One of the most important lessons of Cortés is that voters seeking
to raise access claims prior to an election should exhaust the political
process before resorting to the courts. “Intervention by the federal
courts in state elections has always been a serious business,” not to be
lightly engaged in.254 As in the administrative law context, in which
one must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief in an
Article III court,255 so too, as a practical matter, must voters seeking to
curb the disenfranchising effects of long lines (or other access obstacles) pursue advocacy efforts outside the federal judiciary first.
In practice, this may entail voters and public interest groups lobbying policymakers with regard to specific voting-related concerns in
the months before an election. Those lobbying for change should
develop concrete and workable proposals for reform and then engage
in good-faith advocacy to obtain the desired results. Such lobbying
should take place well in advance of an election, so that reforms may
actually be implemented on Election Day. Only if such advocacy
efforts fail should voters seek recourse in court.
253 Elmendorf, supra note 165, at 315–17 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995) (holding that Ohio statute that imposed fine for
distributing anonymous campaign literature was not narrowly drawn and violated the
First Amendment, and coining the term “electoral mechanics”)).
254 Oden v. Brittain, 396 U.S. 1210, 1211 (1969).
255 See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).
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As Part I.A explained, voters and public interest groups in Pennsylvania advocated for months for a rule requiring the distribution of
emergency paper ballots when half or more of DRE machines in a
precinct failed. Their efforts were flatly rejected by the Secretary of
State, leaving voters with no choice but to seek judicial intervention if
they wanted to forestall potentially unacceptable lines on Election
Day. In their complaint, in briefing, and at the evidentiary hearing in
Cortés, plaintiffs emphasized the nature and extent of voters’ advocacy
efforts to which the Commonwealth paid no heed.256 While this advocacy history was not explicitly mentioned in the court’s written decision, it likely played an important subdoctrinal role in convincing the
court that a potential disaster was on the horizon that only the court
could mitigate.257
Where plaintiffs do not demonstrate exhaustion of the political
process, it is much less likely that a federal court will intervene on
their behalf. Virginia State Conference of NAACP v. Kaine258 illustrates
the point. This 2008 time tax challenge alleged that, due to inequitable allocation of polling place resources, Virginia voters, and especially black voters, “will face even longer lines than existed in 2004,
and many more voters will lose their right to vote in this [2008] Presidential election than the last.”259 The plaintiffs sought to allocate a
greater number of voting machines to Norfolk, Richmond, and Virginia Beach by Election Day.260 While seeking sweeping relief,261 the
written record makes no mention of any attempts by the plaintiffs to
work out their concerns in the political process.262 The absence of
evidence on this issue might well have shaped the court’s perception
256 See, e.g., Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 151 (testimony of
Jerome Mondesire) (“[W]e tried to have a conversation with [the] office [of the Secretary of State] and we were turned down several times.”).
257 Cf. Elmendorf, supra note 165, at 380 (discussing subdoctrinal role of empirical evidence in persuading a federal court of the extent of an electoral mechanics
problem).
258 No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D. Va. dismissed Nov. 18, 2008).
259 Complaint at 2, Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D. Va. Oct. 28, 2008).
260 Id.
261 See discussion infra Part IV.E.
262 See Complaint, Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D. Va. Oct. 28, 2008); Declaration of
Walter Richard Mebane, Jr., Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2008); Plaintiffs’
Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for a Declaratory Judgment and
Preliminary Injunction, Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D. Va. Oct. 28, 2008); Motion to
Intervene by Albermarle County Republican Committee, Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 3, 2008); Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed by Albermarle
County Republican Committee, Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 2008).
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that its intervention was not essential to protect the rights of those
marginalized by the political process.
In this regard, Cortés is emblematic of the special role for federal
court intervention when no other actors are willing to redress harms
to vulnerable populations through ordinary politics.263 In the voting
rights context, Justice Clark’s concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr264
reveals how these considerations may weigh on a federal judge’s mind
in deciding whether or not to intervene in a state’s administration of
elections. Even where a state election law “offends the Equal Protection Clause,” Justice Clark would not intervene “into so delicate a field
if there were any other relief available” to people in the state.265 Federal judicial intervention, on this approach, is warranted only when
voters lack “‘practical opportunities’ for exercising their political
weight at the polls” and “without judicial intervention will be saddled
with the present discrimination in the affairs of their state
government.”266
Two years later, in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,267 the Court rejected political exhaustion as a doctrinal requirement.268 But such considerations may still be at work. Given
traditional federalism concerns in state election matters, judges are
likely to weigh whether “practical opportunities” other than federal
judicial relief are available to voters and whether “the people” will be
“stymied . . . without judicial intervention” in deciding whether to
grant relief that would mitigate a time tax or otherwise guarantee
access to the franchise.269
Elsewhere, in the context of constitutional challenges to state and
local land-use decisions, the Supreme Court has established explicit
political exhaustion requirements in recognition of the traditional
263 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing that courts should use
judicial review to reinforce democratic processes).
264 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
265 Id. at 258 (Clark, J., concurring).
266 Id. at 259 (quoting MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948)).
267 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
268 Id. at 736 (“[I]ndividual constitutional rights cannot be deprived, or denied
judicial effectuation, because of the existence of a nonjudicial remedy through which
relief . . . the individual voters seek, might be achieved.”).
269 Baker, 369 U.S. at 259 (Clark, J., concurring). Of course, this political advocacy
must not come at the expense of a timely filed lawsuit. See discussion infra Part IV.C.;
cf. Barthelmes v. Morris, 342 F. Supp. 153, 160 (D. Md. 1972) (holding that “[t]he fact
that [the plaintiffs] first sought redress through legislative change was an election on
their part which affords no valid excuse for the delay” in filing suit seeking injunctive
relief against upcoming primary).
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prerogatives of the states over land use matters.270 Just as states traditionally are the masters of land use matters, so too do states have primary authority over “The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections.”271 That federalism-minded exhaustion doctrines are
explicit in some areas of law makes it more likely that loosely analogous doctrines are at play in other areas, such as voter access, over
which the states have traditionally held sway.
B. Momentous Elections
The Supreme Court has held time and again that, except for elections for special purpose districts,272 elections are equally important in
terms of the right to vote273 and the subject of an election is irrelevant.274 While this may be the stated doctrine, it does not reflect what
the federal judiciary actually does in practice with respect to intervening in state election administration. In fact, it appears that the federal
judiciary is more likely to intervene in closely contested elections and
particularly in presidential races. In considering whether to intervene, it may be that federal courts look to the intensity of the election
contest and its national implications. Where court intervention may
influence the outcome by, for example, guaranteeing ballot access for
voters who may not otherwise be able to vote, intervention is more
likely.
Consider this scenario: a federal suit is filed to contest wait times
in a local school board election in an overwhelmingly Republican precinct where the outcome of the election is guaranteed to favor the
Republican candidate. Here, it is highly unlikely that a federal court
would intervene to mitigate the prospect of long lines. The court
might label the lines garden variety election irregularities, unworthy
of federal judicial involvement, or decide that prudential doctrines
prevent it from reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims at all.
270 See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 186 (1985).
271 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
272 See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728
(1973) (establishing the special-purpose district exception to one-person, one-vote
doctrine).
273 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres: Is the Right
to Vote a Constitutional Constraint on Partisan Nominating Conventions, 6 ELECTION L.J.
399, 403–04 (2007)
274 See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 146–47 (1972) (treating primary elections and general elections interchangeably); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 629–31 (1969) (extending the right to vote to local government elections);
Avery v. Midland County, Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 475–76 (1968) (same).
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By contrast, closely contested presidential elections appear to
have a special status in terms of the likelihood of federal court intervention, particularly after Bush v. Gore. In both Bush and Cortés, federal court intervention might have been considered surprising in light
of a strict reading of relevant precedents. But in both cases, a close
presidential election was being contested. The cases suggest a sub
silentio doctrine at work: federal courts are more willing to intervene
in a state’s administration of an election in a momentous election,
such as a presidential contest in a swing state, than in a local election,
particularly if the winner is a foregone conclusion.275
In Cortés, the plaintiffs presented ample evidence on the momentous nature of the 2008 contest: Pennsylvania was a key swing state in
the presidential election; electronic voting machines were virtually
guaranteed to break down in substantial numbers and cause long
lines; officials refused to enact reasonable policies to mitigate long
lines; nearly 400,000 new citizens had registered to vote since the primary; nearly a quarter of precincts had more registered voters
assigned to them than state law permitted; and the primary showed
that thousands of voters were likely to be disenfranchised if the court
did nothing. NAACP President Mondesire testified: “[T]his will be an
epic election in Philadelphia, in Reading and in Pittsburgh and in
Harrisburg. Turnout is going to be phenomenal. We expect the lines
to be of epic proportions like they were in South Africa when Nelson
Mandela was [running for President].”276 In this election, unlike
others, there would be consequences if voters were turned away by
long lines: “[Voters] will become disgruntled and they will lose faith in
the system and may leave and may even take stronger action.”277 This
threat of “stronger action” was broadcast in the news media before the
decision was announced.278
275 See, e.g., Donohue v. Bd. of Elections, 435 F. Supp. 957, 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(“The fact that a national election might require judicial intervention, concomitantly
implicating the interests of the entire nation, if anything, militates in favor of interpreting the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts to include challenges to Presidential elections.”).
276 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 146. Mondesire’s predictions were accurate: 220,000 more voters in Pennsylvania cast a ballot in 2008 compared with 2004. Most of the increases in voter turnout were in the most populous
counties—which include Philadelphia, Reading, and Pittsburgh—and among black
and Latino voters. See NONPROFIT VOTER ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, VOTER TURNOUT
BRIEF: PENNSYLVANIA 2008, http://www.everybodyvote.com/component/option,com_
docman/Itemid,0/task,doc_download/gid,78.
277 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 147.
278 See, e.g., Cynthia Henry, U.S. Judge Hears Pa. Ballot Lawsuit, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Oct. 29, 2008, at B01.
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The ruling in Cortés reflects an acute awareness of the momentous nature of the 2008 election: “While all elections are important,
this year a president and vice-president of the United States will be
chosen. . . . [T]he number of voters at this election will probably be
the highest on record.”279 In other words, the 2008 presidential contest in Pennsylvania was particularly worthy of federal court
intervention.
While a close presidential contest in a swing state may make it
more likely for a federal court to intervene, it offers no guarantee of
such involvement. In Kaine, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that
the democratic process in Virginia was at risk because of the misallocation of voting machines,280 but this was insufficient for federal court
intervention. Litigating in the context of a momentous contest, then,
may be a necessary but not sufficient factor in succeeding in voter
access litigation.
C. Pre-Election Litigation
The purpose of voter access litigation should be to ensure that as
many citizens as possible can vote in an election. Such challenges
should be forward looking, rather than reactive, and pursue pre-election relief to prevent harm before it occurs. Post-election voter access
challenges—such as those seeking a recount or a new election—
should be litigated sparingly.281
There are myriad disadvantages of federal courts invalidating
election results. Among them are additional expenditures of time
and resources entailed by a new election, its destabilizing impact on
the political process, and an antidemocratic effect that may result
from lesser interest and participation in a rerun of an old race.282 An
additional problem with any post-election judicial intervention is that
it requires a court to inject itself “in the worst way into the political
thicket,” which can “undermine the legitimacy of the courts.”283 The
279 NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764 (E.D. Pa.
2008).
280 See Complaint at 2, Va. State Conference of NAACP v. Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508
(E.D. Va. dismissed Nov. 18, 2008).
281 For the types of remedies that are imposed post-election, see Edward B. Foley,
The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 350, 362–74 (2007); Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 265 (2007).
282 Kenneth W. Starr, Federal Judicial Invalidation as a Remedy for Irregularities in State
Elections, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1092, 1105–08 (1974).
283 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 993 (2005).
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chaos and confusion resulting from judicial intervention in the wake
of the 2000 presidential election shows what a mess post-election judicial intervention can create.284
The disadvantages of post-election judicial intervention are likely
to apply equally in the context of post-election time tax litigation.
The class of cases in which federal courts would look favorably on a
post-election time tax challenge is likely limited, as courts generally
examine the plaintiffs’ pre-election diligence in deciding whether or
not to grant relief in voter access cases.285 This is not to say that such
a challenge cannot be won. Twice before, post-election challenges to
long lines have been successful.286 In both cases, local contests were
at stake and the courts ordered new elections.
In litigating a pre-election voter access issue, plaintiffs must convince a judge that only pre-election relief is a realistic option. At the
hearing for Cortés, this issue arose when the Commonwealth suggested
that the plaintiffs should seek post-election relief. Plaintiffs’ counsel
Andrew G. Celli, Jr. responded sharply: “[A]sking [the court] to set
aside a statewide election in a presidential year where this state
promises to be a critical state in deciding who the next president’s
going to be” is “exactly what we’re trying to avoid.”287 “[T]hat the
[C]ommonwealth’s lawyer would stand before a federal judge and say
they should come back later and hold up the rest of the country is
absurd.”288 A post-election time tax challenge in Pennsylvania in
2008, in other words, simply was not an option—a fact reflected in the
judicial opinion.289
In encouraging pre-election voter access challenges, I fall
squarely in line with scholars who urge courts “[to] be more willing to
entertain pre-election challenges and less willing to entertain postelection challenges, at least for those issues that could reasonably have
284 See generally id. at 938–44 (discussing the confusion following the 2000 presidential election).
285 See, e.g., Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310, 313–15 (5th Cir. 1973).
286 Ury v. Santee, 303 F. Supp. 119, 127 (N.D. Ill. 1969); In re 1984 Gen. Election
for the Office of the Council of the Twp. of Maple Shade, 497 A.2d 577, 591–92 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
287 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 370.
288 Id.
289 NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (E.D. Pa.
2008) (“This is not a matter we can decide through hindsight after the election has
concluded . . . . We must do our best, based on the record before us, to determine
whether inoperable machines are likely to cause any serious burden to the fundamental right to vote . . . .”).
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been foreseen and raised before the election.”290 The only meaningful post-election remedy for voters turned away from the polls is a
renewed opportunity to cast their ballots in a new election, which is
rarely justifiable as an equitable remedy.291
In terms of the timing of a pre-election challenge, Cortés was
exceptional with regard to the speed with which the federal court
intervened.292 Most cases filed just before an election are not successful.293 In Purcell v. Gonzalez,294 the Supreme Court admonished federal courts not to intervene in state election policies on the eve of an
election: “Court orders affecting elections . . . can themselves result in
voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the
polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.”295 These
290 Hasen, supra note 283, at 991; see generally id. at 991–99 (arguing that preelection challenges should be favored over post-election challenges).
291 See Hasen, supra note 283, at 993–94; Starr, supra note 282, at 1105–08.
292 Ideally, the case would not have been filed just twelve days before the election
but instead in early September 2008, just after Secretary Cortés announced the problematic Directive. Unavoidable circumstances left the plaintiffs with no choice but to
file less than two weeks before the election if they were to file at all. See supra note 36.
Rather than ignore the issue of the late filing date, the plaintiffs affirmatively
explained these circumstances to the court to demonstrate that any delay in filing the
case was not without basis. Because of the late date at which the suit was filed, the
plaintiffs bore the additional burden of demonstrating that the relief sought could be
rapidly implemented throughout the Commonwealth on Election Day. The late date
of the judicial victory likely complicated on-the-ground implementation of the court
order on Election Day, as most poll workers statewide had already been trained by the
time the order was issued. See Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
293 For example, Kaine, filed just six days before the general election, did not
result in any federal court intervention. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 582 F. Supp.
2d 957 (S.D. Ohio 2008), is at the other end of the unsuccessful spectrum. There, the
Ohio Republican Party filed suit in late September 2008 to, inter alia, enjoin the
Secretary of State to update a statewide voter registration database to comply with
Section 303 of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545
(2006). The district court granted plaintiffs a temporary restraining order (TRO).
Id. A Sixth Circuit panel vacated the TRO, Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 543
F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008), but an en banc panel reinstated it. Ohio Republican
Party v. Brunner, 544 F.3d 711, 721 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Ultimately, the
Supreme Court intervened to vacate the TRO. Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party,
129 S. Ct. 5 (2008) (per curiam) (holding that it is not sufficiently likely that Congress
authorized a district court to enforce Section 303 of HAVA in an action brought by a
private litigant).
294 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
295 Id. at 4–5; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964) (warning lower
courts to “consider the proximity of a forthcoming election” and “avoid a disruption
of the election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that
could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the
requirements of the court’s decree”).
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considerations counsel filing a pre-election voter access challenge as
early as practicable before an election to maximize the likelihood of
success.
D. Facial Challenges After Crawford
Establishing standing and ripeness is especially difficult in election disputes because courts routinely use such prudential doctrines
to avoid interfering with state election practices.296 A series of recent
Supreme Court cases, in the election law context and otherwise, offer
yet another prudential ground on which a court can decline to intervene in a state’s administration of an election: facial invalidation is an
inappropriate remedy.297 In Crawford, the plurality held that for facial
invalidation, plaintiffs must demonstrate that “the statute imposes
‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on a[ ] class of voters.”298 By
contrast, for an as-applied challenge, plaintiffs do not “bear [such] a
heavy burden of persuasion.”299 Crawford highlights the difficulties
that plaintiffs in voter access cases will encounter in pursuing facial
challenges to election laws.
Notwithstanding the Court’s reluctance to entertain facial challenges, it is worth developing such challenges to state policies or practices where the risk of disenfranchisement is substantial and a facial
challenge is the only effective means of ensuring access to the
franchise for all eligible voters. In many instances, a pre-election asapplied challenge will be awkward because of the difficulties associated with identifying and proving exactly who will be harmed by a
challenged election policy on Election Day. In Cortés, for example,
voting rights groups knew that DRE machine failures would be widespread throughout the Commonwealth on Election Day, but they
could not pinpoint exactly where such failures would occur and so
could not bring an as-applied challenge on behalf of voters in only
those precincts. In situations like this, it makes sense to pursue a
facial challenge because of the certainty of disenfranchisement but
296 See Hasen, supra note 283, at 994.
297 See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873
(2005) (reviewing facial challenges outside the election law context and arguing that
the Court’s jurisprudence inappropriately exaggerates the difference between facial
and as-applied challenges and obscures the important roles that severability and substantive constitutional law play in facial challenges); Persily & Rosenberg, supra note
48, at 1644 & nn.1–2 (collecting recent Supreme Court cases that express a “strong
preference” for as-applied, rather than facial, challenges in the election law context).
298 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 (2008) (quoting
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)).
299 Id. at 1621.
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the uncertainty of who will be deprived of the vote. Moreover, there
are situations where a facial challenge to a state election law will be
more palatable to the federal judiciary than an as-applied challenge
because the former may be designed to help all voters access the
franchise and thus be politically neutral, whereas the latter may be
designed to assist only a certain portion of the electorate.300
With compelling evidence, prudential concerns about facial challenges, as well as standing and ripeness, can be overcome. Numerous
concrete examples of disenfranchisement as well as empirical evidence proving that the harm is likely to be widespread are likely to go
a long way in motivating a federal judge to intervene in state election
policies to correct or stave off an injustice. Cortés offers three insights
into how to build a compelling evidentiary record in support of a
facial challenge in a voter access case.
The first involves the importance of a primary election. A primary election can be an ideal testing ground for determining whether
a state policy unduly burdens the rights of many to vote. If, by the eve
of a general election, a state has taken no steps—or only minimal
steps—toward modifying the problematic state policy, the primary
experience may be a strong predictor of disenfranchisement on Election Day. In litigating Cortés, the plaintiffs repeatedly relied on Pennsylvania’s April 2008 primary experience as a predictor of long lines
and voters leaving the polls without casting ballots on Election Day.301
The court found the comparison persuasive, reasoning, “History is
our guide.”302
Second, it is essential to choose plaintiffs who have suffered or
are at high risk of suffering violations of a constitutional right. In the
context of a challenge to the time tax, individual plaintiffs should be
voters who had no choice but to leave the polls without casting their
ballots because of long lines in the recent past and/or those who are
at high risk of the same in an upcoming election. The individual
plaintiffs in Cortés fit into those categories.303 Their testimony
reflected that, despite their commitments to voting, they each had difficulty voting in the primary and, due to pressing work or childcare
obligations or both, long lines put them at risk of being unable to cast
300 See discussion infra Part IV.E.
301 See discussion supra Part I.B.
302 NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (E.D. Pa.
2008). In contrast, the complaint in Kaine made scant mention of Virginia’s 2008
primary experience and the problems that attended it. Complaint, Va. State Conference of NAACP v. Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D. Va. Oct. 28, 2008).
303 Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 760–61.

\\server05\productn\N\NDL\85-1\NDL105.txt

232

unknown

Seq: 56

notre dame law review

30-NOV-09

7:57

[vol. 85:1

ballots on Election Day.304 Their narratives of disenfranchisement
evoked those of many unknown but similarly situated Pennsylvania
voters.305
Relying on individual plaintiffs alone may not be sufficient to
convince a court to grant relief in a facial challenge to a state’s election policy because it may appear that only a handful of citizens are
concerned about the issue. To overcome this perception, it is advisable to include bi- or nonpartisan306 statewide organizations as plaintiffs in voter access litigation. In Cortés, two nonpartisan organizations
served as plaintiffs, the Election Reform Network and the NAACP
State Conference of Pennsylvania.307 Both organizations seek to
ensure access to the franchise for Pennsylvania citizens.308 The
NAACP State Conference of Pennsylvania has a particularly large
membership, with more than 15,000 members among forty-six
branches across the Commonwealth.309 By participating in the suit,
these organizations lent their institutional credibility to the case and
demonstrated the breadth of statewide concern about long lines.
The Supreme Court’s close examination of the record in Crawford highlights the importance of framing the issue through the experiences of plaintiffs who have suffered real harm. The Crawford
plurality found that not one plaintiff had expressed a personal inability to vote due to the challenged law.310 For a single elderly plaintiff
unable to obtain a birth certificate, the option of voting absentee was
available.311 In Crawford, it is conceivable that had all the plaintiffs
challenging the law actually been unable to cast a ballot because of
the photo identification requirement, the Court would have struck
down the law. Three Justices in Crawford would have struck down the
Indiana law at issue on the record before the Court. In the plurality
opinion, Justice Stevens, along with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy, did not do so because of the lack of “any concrete evidence
of the burden imposed on voters who currently lack photo identifica304 Id.
305 These narratives of disenfranchisement might be most compelling in states
where voters must cast a ballot on Election Day or not at all, i.e., states with no-excuses
absentee voting.
306 See discussion infra Part IV.E.
307 Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
308 See Election Reform Network, About The Election Reform Network, http://
www.electionreformnetwork.us/node/2 (last visited Sept. 4, 2009); Pennsylvania State
Conference of NAACP Branches, NAACP Mission, http://pastatenaacp.org/mission.
htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
309 See Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 758 n.1.
310 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622 (2008).
311 Id.
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tion.”312 In just the previous Term, the Supreme Court unanimously
held in the context of a challenge to an Arizona law requiring proof
of citizenship at the polls that “the possibility that qualified voters
might be turned away from the polls would caution any district judge
to give careful consideration to the plaintiffs’ challenges.”313 This
apparent sensitivity from all members of the Court suggests that with
plaintiffs whose experiences demonstrate concrete harm, a facial challenge to a state law that restricts voter access to the polls might well
garner the favor of at least five Justices.
This raises the third point: use of empirical evidence to demonstrate the likelihood of the feared harm. Narratives of disenfranchisement should be supplemented with hard numbers demonstrating a
likelihood of disenfranchisement. The plurality opinion in Crawford
suggests that a collection of anecdotes is not enough, ruling against
the plaintiffs because, among other omissions, they had not presented
“how common the problem is”314 or “the number of registered voters
without photo identification”315—facts at the heart of the case. The
Crawford dissent grudgingly acknowledged the latter omission.316
While pointing to cases in which “empirical precision” had not been
“demanded for raising a voting-rights claim,”317 the dissent conceded
that “of course it would greatly aid a plaintiff to establish his claims
beyond mathematical doubt.”318
Where comprehensive data are unavailable, reliable expert testimony is essential. The plaintiffs in Crawford submitted expert testimony, but the district court rejected it “as utterly incredible and
unreliable,”319 inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and
supportive of defendants’ claims, not plaintiffs’.320 Obviously this is
not how any plaintiff would want her expert testimony to be received
by a court. By contrast, in Cortés plaintiffs called experts to opine on
the empirical question of the likelihood of long lines at the polls on
312 Id.
313 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam).
314 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623.
315 Id. at 1622.
316 Id. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Petitioners, to be sure, failed to nail down
precisely how great the cohort of discouraged and totally deterred voters will be
. . . .”).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 803 (S.D. Ind. 2006),
aff’d sub nom., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007),
aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
320 Id.
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November 4.321 Douglas Jones testified at the hearing322 and Daniel
Lopresti, also a voting technology expert, submitted written testimony.323 Both conveyed that significant disenfranchisement was
likely as a result of the Commonwealth’s Directive.324 Jones’s testimony was not rebutted and it apparently influenced the court, as it
was cited extensively in the decision.325
E. Narrow and Politically Neutral Remedies
No matter how great a case is assembled, there are some forms of
relief that a federal court simply cannot grant.326 To take an extreme
example, a federal court will not decree an end to all wait times at all
polling places in a state. Nor will a federal court decree an end to wait
times in only overwhelmingly Democratic districts without granting
such relief in Republican ones. A court must act within institutional
constraints.327 To maximize the likelihood of success in voter access
litigation, plaintiffs should be cognizant of these institutional constraints and seek narrow and politically neutral relief.
321 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 112.
322 Id. at 96–97, 107.
323 Declaration of Daniel P. Lopresti ¶ 18, Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d. 757 (No. 2:08cv-05048).
324 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 107, 112.
325 See NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761, 765
(E.D. Pa. 2008).
326 For a theoretical discussion of the rights-remedy distinction, see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
327 In the voting rights context, the Supreme Court has frequently commented on
institutional constraints, perhaps nowhere more painfully than in Giles v. Harris, 189
U.S. 475 (1903). There, the Court denied relief to Giles and more than five thousand
black citizens who wished to be added to the voting rolls of Alabama. Id. at 488.
Justice Holmes, who fought for the Union Army, explained that the political situation
in Alabama precluded the Court from granting any relief:
Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of the
court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be
an empty form. Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great
political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a State and the State
itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department of
the government of the United States.
Id. at 488. Although the passage of time has undermined the holding of Giles, the
opinion still reflects the Court’s sensitivity to political considerations in voting rights
cases. More recently, this sensitivity has manifested in the weight the Court has
afforded to concerns about voter fraud in upholding state photo identification laws.
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1618–20 (2008); Purcell
v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).
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Narrow relief is that which builds on existing state policies, compared with sweeping relief which seeks an overhaul of a state’s election apparatus. Politically neutral relief is that which is not overtly
political. Narrow and politically neutral relief is more likely to be
granted than sweeping and partisan relief. In terms of the Anderson
test,328 it may be that a state’s interest in refusing to implement a
minor, nonpartisan modification to its election administration procedures is presumptively weak where such a change has the potential to
enfranchise many voters.
It is tricky to pursue narrow and politically neutral relief that will
guarantee voters’ access to the polls. In developing Cortés, plaintiffs’
counsel took great care to pursue relief that a court might be willing
to grant just days before an election.329 In the grand scheme of
things, the relief sought appears very limited: a minor modification to
the existing state policy so that emergency paper ballots are distributed when half or more DRE machines fail, instead of when all DRE
machines fail.
The nature of the relief sought influenced the court in Cortés. At
the hearing, Judge Bartle agreed with the plaintiffs’ attorney that “if
the remedy is benign, if it’s easy to accomplish,” then the “burden of
demonstrating an interference with the right to vote is not as high as
it would be” if more dramatic relief were sought, such as having the
court “order all sixty-seven counties in the [C]ommonwealth to
purchase sixteen new machines per precinct.”330 The court noted
that the “plaintiffs’ request for relief is reasonable and even modest in
light of the grave injury they seek to prevent.”331
The importance of seeking narrow and politically neutral relief is
highlighted in Crawford. There, the plaintiffs did not seek a tweak of
Indiana’s election policies. Rather, the plaintiffs sought a dramatic
court order that would preclude the state from implementing the
core provision of its system for identifying voters. Complicating matters further, the case had an overt political bias, as the Indiana Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central Committee
had filed suit to challenge the voter identification law promptly after
328 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
329 Initially, plaintiffs sought both the Fifty Percent Rule and a requirement that,
on Election Day, each precinct have available emergency paper ballots equal in number to at least twenty percent of the registered voters in that precinct. Complaint at
22, Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757 (No. 2:08-cv-05048). Plaintiffs chose not to pursue the
latter relief, a sacrifice made because it was of doubtful feasibility in light of the limited time available.
330 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 41, at 366.
331 Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
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its enactment.332 Considered in terms of the federal judiciary’s constraints, perhaps it is unsurprising that every court that considered the
plaintiffs’ request for relief declined to grant it.333
The same lessons are evident in Kaine. Six days before the election, the plaintiffs sought a dramatic order requiring, among other
things, that the cities of Norfolk, Richmond, and Virginia Beach
secure an adequate number of machines and allocate those
machines in a more equitable manner and in a way that ensures
that voters do not have to wait more than 45 minutes to vote, or reallocate the existing inventory of machines in a more equitable
manner and instruct poll workers to offer voters whose wait to vote
by machine is likely to exceed 45 minutes the option to wait for a
machine or to vote with a paper ballot.334

The relief sought required significant changes to Virginia’s election apparatus, and left many questions unanswered: Why are Norfolk, Richmond, and Virginia Beach subject to special treatment?
How are enough voting machines to be secured for those cities with
the election less than a week away? How will polling places outside
Norfolk, Richmond, and Virginia cope if voting machine places are
reallocated to those cities? Who will make reallocation decisions so
quickly? Why is forty-five minutes the apparent cut-off time for a long
line in only the selected cities? The record in the case did not adequately address these complicated issues,335 which likely contributed
to the court’s decision not to intervene.336 Moreover, the relief
sought in the case was not politically neutral. Given the demographics
of Norfolk, Richmond, and Virginia Beach, the relief plainly favored
the Democratic Party.337 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the case did not
result in a judicial victory.
332 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614. This suit was consolidated with a second suit filed
by two elected officials and several nonprofit organizations representing the elderly,
disabled, poor, and minorities. Id.
333 It is worth noting that the Crawford plaintiffs lost by close votes in the Seventh
Circuit, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling in favor of defendants two-to-one), and
the Supreme Court, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (ruling in favor of defendants with three
justices dissenting).
334 Complaint at 3, Va. State Conference of NAACP v. Kaine, No. 2:08-cv-508 (E.D.
Va. dismissed Nov. 18, 2008).
335 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
336 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
337 In Norfolk, Richmond, and Virginia Beach combined, 91,545 more ballots
were cast in favor of Barack Obama than John McCain in the 2008 general election.
See VA. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, STATEWIDE RESULTS BY LOCALITY 25, 27 (2008),
http://www.sbe.virginia.gov/cms/documents/ElectionResults/Statewide_Results_by_Locality.pdf.
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League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner,338 another voter access
case, highlights the importance of seeking narrow relief even where
the relief sought does not have an overt political bias. Filed four years
ago, the plaintiffs have sought systemic reforms including uniform
standards for the processing of all voter registration and absentee ballots; an adequate number of functioning voting machines at each precinct on Election Day; guaranteed access to the polls for disabled
voters; timely and adequate recruiting, hiring, and training of poll
workers; and “uniform standards and processes to ensure that all registered voters in a precinct are able to vote without unreasonable
delay or hardship on election day.”339 Since the case was filed, the
district court considered and granted in part and denied in part several motions to dismiss filed by the defendants Governor and Secretary of State.340 On February 10, 2006, the district court granted
defendants leave to take an interlocutory appeal on the central issue
in the case: “whether [the] plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are cognizable.”341 More than three years later, after two federal election cycles
passed, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit finally concluded
that “[i]f true, [the plaintiffs’] allegations could establish that Ohio’s
voting system deprives its citizens of the right to vote or severely burdens the exercise of that right depending on where they live in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”342 The case was returned to the
district court until a final settlement was reached on June 16, 2009.343
Many factors have contributed to the slow pace of Brunner,
including defendants’ four motions to dismiss and the Sixth Circuit’s
delay in issuing a decision on the interlocutory appeal. Among these
factors certainly is the striking breadth of the relief sought by the
plaintiffs. Any court would be cautious about requiring a complete
overhaul of a state’s voting system. The parties’ final settlement of the
matter allowed the court to sidestep direct involvement in these issues.
338 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008).
339 Complaint at 61, League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 432 F. Supp. 2d 723
(N.D. Ohio 2005) (No. 3:05-cv-7309), leave to appeal granted in part by No. 3:05-cv-7309
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., League of Women
Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008).
340 League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell, 432 F. Supp. 2d 723 (N.D. Ohio
2005) [hereinafter Blackwell I]; League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell, 432 F.
Supp. 2d 734 (N.D. Ohio 2006) [hereinafter Blackwell II]; League of Women Voters of
Ohio v. Blackwell, 432 F. Supp. 2d 742 (N.D. Ohio 2006) [hereinafter Blackwell III].
341 League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell, No. 3:05-cv-7309, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8432, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2006).
342 Brunner, 548 F.3d at 478.
343 Order Enforcing Settlement Agreement at 2, League of Women Voters, No. 3:05cv-7309 (N.D. Ohio June 19, 2009) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
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Finally, any discussion of seeking politically neutral relief from
the federal judiciary in election cases would not be complete without
at least a mention of Bush v. Gore. Partisan considerations motivated
the case, as then–Vice President Al Gore sought a manual recount in
four counties—Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade344—
guaranteed to favor him. Whether or not the Supreme Court was
influenced by partisan bias in Bush v. Gore, it surely did not help matters that Gore did not seek politically neutral relief.
V. BEYOND

THE

COURTS

A judicial victory should not be the endgame. In considering
how to guarantee access to the franchise, voters must rely on the
courts only as a last resort and achieve as much change as possible
through the political process. If courts are used in the project of voter
enfranchisement, they should be relied upon minimally, as one facet
of a political strategy.345
Throughout our history, the most important advances in
expanding and guaranteeing access to the franchise have been the
result of political victories: the Fifteenth Amendment, the Seventeenth Amendment, the Nineteenth Amendment, the Twenty-Third
Amendment, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment. As Akhil Amar has noted, “[n]o amendment has ever
cut back on prior voting rights or rights of equal inclusion.”346 The
same trend in expanding and guaranteeing access to the franchise is
reflected in federal legislation: the Voting Rights Act of 1965,347 the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993,348 and the Help America
Vote Act of 2002.349
The federal judiciary has played an important role in interpreting
some of these political achievements. Among the best examples of
the federal judiciary guaranteeing access to the franchise are cases like
Harman,350 Harper,351 O’Brien,352 South Carolina v. Katzenbach,353 and
344 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 (2000) (per curiam).
345 Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for
Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 966–67 (2006) (suggesting that state legislatures “are doing constitutional work within election statutes” and that “[c]ourts are
aptly situated to tweak statutory and administrative systems as a way of promoting
given constitutional norms, without appropriating the system outright”).
346 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 19 (2005).
347 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973bb-1 (2006).
348 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (2006).
349 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C., 10 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
350 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); see discussion supra Part III.D.
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Katzenbach v. Morgan.354 Yet in each of these cases, the judiciary’s role
in guaranteeing access to the franchise is at the margins, in a sense,
because it is not the source of these achievements.355 The federal
judiciary’s record on voting rights, moreover, is far from unblemished. In cases such as Minor v. Hapersetts,356 Breedlove,357 Giles v. Harris,358 Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,359 and Oregon v.
Mitchell,360 the Court has not allowed citizens to vote. This history suggests that the federal judiciary is not a reliable ally in the struggle to
ensure access to the franchise. Given the primacy of the political process in expanding and guaranteeing voter enfranchisement, we
should consider how the time tax can be mitigated through legislation
and politics.
On a state-by-state basis, a number of measures are worth advocating. At a typical polling site, long lines tend to occur disproportionately in the early morning and evening hours on Election Day, at the
tail ends of the typical workday.361 At these and other peak times,
lines accumulate, in part, because a polling site is generally set up to
accommodate an evenly distributed stream of voters. Regardless of
whether three-hundred voters are waiting or only three, the same limited number of voting machines are generally available—an organizational structure that exacerbates lines. A relatively low-cost measure to
change the organizational structure of a typical polling site is to imple351 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see discussion supra Part
III.A.
352 O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); see discussion supra Part III.A.
353 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act’s suspension of
literacy tests as a legitimate response to violations of the Fifteenth Amendment).
354 384 U.S. 641, 653–56 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act’s suspension of
English tests).
355 Cf. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 137, at 148 (recognizing the Warren Court as
“one—but only one—of the actors in this great drama” of the “civil rights
revolution”).
356 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (refusing to guarantee women’s right to vote), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
357 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (refusing to strike down state poll tax), overruled by
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668–69 (1966).
358 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) (refusing to hold unconstitutional the disenfranchisement of thousands of black citizens).
359 360 U.S. 45, 50–54 (1959) (refusing to strike down literacy tests as
unconstitutional).
360 400 U.S. 112, 134–35 (1970) (refusing to extend the franchise to eighteenyear-olds in state and local elections), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
361 See, e.g., NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760
(E.D. Pa. 2008); Stuart Eskenazi, Crowds Flock to Polls, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at
A2.
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ment a policy requiring poll workers to provide a paper ballot to any
voter who cannot wait in line to cast a vote.362 This policy would help
guarantee that no voter is turned away from the polls because she
cannot afford to wait. Implementing the policy would require simply
printing extra paper ballots and safeguarding them with other types of
paper ballots, such as absentee and overseas ballots, which is a relatively easy process because poll workers already are familiar with handling such ballots.363
In Ohio, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner implemented this
type of policy before the 2008 primary: any voter assigned to a precinct that relied on DRE machines was given the choice to use a paper
ballot.364 Lines at each precinct are divided, one for DRE machines
and another for paper ballots.365 According to Brunner, paper ballots
“now provide an orderly and efficient alternative means of voting in
the event of long lines on Election Day.”366 The paper ballots also
provide a more general “safety valve” for other problems afflicting polling places.367 Secretary Brunner has explained in no uncertain terms
the importance of the paper ballot option:
Back-up paper ballots have already proven vital in the March presidential primary. While voters and election officials faced ice storms,
flood, blackouts and bomb threats, back-up paper ballots allowed
voting to continue. Our back-up paper ballot directive ensured that
Ohioans could exercise their right to vote without unnecessary
delays despite these emergencies—and will assure that right again
in the November general election.368

362 If a voter cannot wait in line to even sign in at her precinct, she still should be
given the option of voting by a provisional ballot. See infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text.
363 See Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 762–63; see also 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2006)
(requiring provisional ballots to be made available to voters under certain
circumstances).
364 See Memorandum from Jennifer Brunner, Ohio Sec’y of State, to Ohio County
Boards of Elections (July 25, 2008), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Upload/elections/directives/2008/Dir2008-59.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum].
365 See Ohio Voters Opt for Backup Paper Ballots, THE PUB. REC., Nov. 4, 2008, http://
pubrecord.org/nation/448/ohio-voters-opt-for-backup-paper-ballots/.
366 See Memorandum, supra note 364.
367 Id.
368 Id.
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Fully funded by the federal government, Ohio’s paper ballot program
has been “praised by Republicans and Democrats alike in
Congress.”369
Voters relied on paper ballots in significant numbers in Ohio on
Election Day.370 In Montgomery County, for example, about thirteen
percent of voters chose paper ballots over electronic ones.371 Statewide, as of the morning of Election Day, the maximum wait time in
most large precincts was no longer than an hour, as the option of
voting by paper ballot kept lines moving.372 It appears that the paper
ballot option made voting in 2008 much easier than in 2004, when
many voters were turned away because of long lines.373 Ohio’s success
in implementing a paper ballot option offers a model for other states
to follow.374 Indeed, Ohio’s paper ballot option proved to be such a
success that the final settlement in Brunner ensures the ongoing availability of paper ballots in Ohio elections through at least the November
2014 election.375
In terms of lobbying for a paper ballot option, the Ohio model
and Cortés may prove to be invaluable tools. The Ohio model proves
that a state can and should voluntarily and successfully implement a
paper ballot system. Cortés demonstrates the consequences of policymakers’ failures to mitigate the time tax on their own: intervention by
369 Id.; see also Press Release, Jennifer Brunner, Ohio Sec’y of State, Brunner Reimburses Counties for Back-up Paper Ballots (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/
PressReleases/2009/2009-01-09.aspx (noting the bipartisan praise).
370 Press Release, Jennifer Brunner, supra note 369.
371 See Lynn Hulsey, Counties Partially Reimbursed for Cost of Paper Ballots, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 13, 2009, at A5.
372 See Ohio Voters Opt For Backup Paper Ballots, supra note 365; Press Release, Jennifer Brunner, Ohio Sec’y of State, Secretary Brunner Issues Mid-Morning Election
Update, Resources for Election Day (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/PressReleases/2008%20Press%20Releases/2008-1104_11amupdates.aspx.
373 See VOTING RIGHTS INST., supra note 112; Adam Cohen, Editorial, No One
Should Have to Stand in Line for 10 Hours to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2008, at A18.
374 For further discussion on the benefits of the Ohio paper ballot option and its
potential drawbacks, see LAWRENCE NORDEN & JESSIE ALLEN, OHIO ELECTIONS SUMMIT,
FINAL REPORT: 2008–2009 OHIO ELECTION SUMMIT AND CONFERENCE 20–21, 69–70
(2009), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/9ccb57cb5de1711173_nkm6bqc3y.pdf.
375 Settlement Agreement, supra note 343, ex. B at 1 (“In order to ensure that
Ohio voters are not denied equal protection of the law nor substantive due process by
virtue of having to wait an unreasonably long period of time in order to exercise the
franchise on Election Day, in statewide general elections in November of even-numbered years and in presidential primary elections, the Ohio Secretary of State . . . shall
issue instructions to all county Boards of Elections . . . for the distribution of paper
ballots in the event of long lines.”).
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the federal judiciary in the form of a permanent injunction requiring
the distribution of emergency paper ballots to reduce long lines.
In addition to offering paper ballots, more far-reaching “convenience voting” methods are already being implemented across the
country, such as early voting, absentee voting, and vote-by-mail.376 As
of the 2008 election, thirty-two states allowed for no-excuse
pre–Election Day in-person voting, either on a voting machine or inperson absentee voting.377 That year, as in years past, elections in
Oregon and most of Washington were conducted by mail.378 At that
time, Maryland voters overwhelmingly approved a constitutional
amendment that makes no-excuse early voting available in the state
starting in 2010.379 Currently, Rhode Island is the only state that does
not allow for early voting and requires an excuse for absentee
voting.380
Convenience voting options are becoming increasingly popular:
the percentage of voters who cast ballots before Election Day
increased from fifteen percent in 2000 to twenty percent in 2004 to
close to thirty percent in 2008.381 On Election Day 2008, lines were
shorter in battleground states that allowed no-excuses early voting.382
It is likely that convenience-voting options reduce the possibility that
voters will leave long lines without casting ballots or refuse to show up
at the polls in the first place. Yet even with the advent of convenience
voting, in states that allow for in-person voting on Election Day, long
lines that turn away voters are still a significant problem, and potentially one of constitutional dimensions, depending on how great the
risk of disenfranchisement is.383
Convenience voting becomes a viable option in a state when a
sufficient number of policymakers become convinced of its benefits.
376 See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 128, at 345.
377 Early Voting Information Center at Reed College, Absentee and Early Voting
Laws, http://earlyvoting.net/states/abslaws.php [hereinafter Absentee and Early Voting Laws] (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
378 Richard Wolf, Election Gives Early-Balloting Initiatives a Boost, USA TODAY, Nov. 7,
2008, at 8A.
379 See Maryland General Assembly 2009: Early Voting Passes, HERALD-MAIL, Apr. 14,
2009, http://www.herald-mail.com/?cmd=displaystory&story_id=220972&format HT ml
(noting that the constitutional amendment passed with about seventy-one percent of
the vote).
380 Absentee and Early Voting Laws, supra note 377.
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 See generally discussion supra Part III (explaining that it remains to be seen
whether federal courts will find that the availability of no-excuses absentee voting
affects the constitutional analysis of long wait times violating voters’ rights).
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To bring about convenience voting, political pressure is necessary. As
part of that pressure, those in support of early voting opportunities
may wish to litigate. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
draw any causal relationship between litigation that seeks to guarantee
access to the polls and the enactment of convenience voting policies,
two developments are worth noting. As discussed in Part IV, neither
Brunner nor Kaine immediately succeeded in achieving federal court
intervention to guarantee access to the franchise. Nevertheless, in the
year after Brunner was filed, Ohio expanded the ease with which citizens could vote by permitting no-excuses early voting thirty-five days
before an election.384 Likewise, earlier this year, in the months after
Kaine was filed, Governor Tim Kaine announced legislation that
would permit in-person, no-excuses early voting during Virginia’s
forty-five-day absentee voting period.385 The Governor’s Office
explained that the proposed legislation was a response to the time tax,
i.e., “crowding on Election Day,” and that “[l]ong lines on election
day drive down participation and increase the likelihood of problems
at polling places.”386 “By allowing all voters to cast an absentee ballot
in person, we can remove some of the practical barriers that prevent
people from participating in the democratic process,” said Governor
Kaine.387 These developments suggest that litigation against the time
tax, even if unsuccessful in court, might add to political pressure to
reduce the time tax.
Another approach to reducing the time tax for workers may be to
advocate for state laws that require employers to provide flex time or
paid time off on Election Day so that workers may vote without giving
up their wages.388 According to a recent survey, thirty states already
require employers to provide time off for employees to vote on Election Day, but most do not require that the time be paid.389 Reducing
the economic consequences of waiting in line for workers may go a
long way to mitigate the time tax for those who are paid hourly wages
by employers willing to comply with this type of law.
384 Editorial, Voting Made Easy, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 2006, at 12A.
385 Press Release, Office of the Va. Governor, Governor Kaine Announces Legislation to Expand Absentee Voting (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.governor.virginia.gov/
mediarelations/NewsReleases/viewRelease.cfm?id=847.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Of course, the loss of wages is not the touchstone of whether or not waiting in
line amounts to a constitutional violation.
389 See The Word on Employment Law With John Phillips, http://employmentlawpost.com/theword/ (Oct. 15, 2008, 12:33 EST).
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Historically, the federal government’s role in administering elections has been limited.390 For this reason, the political process on a
state-by-state basis may be a more palatable avenue for mitigating the
time tax than a federal approach. But there also is a potential federal
fix for the problem of voter disenfranchisement due to long lines on
Election Day. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)391 already requires
provisional ballots to be made available to voters who appear at the
polls and find that their names are not on the voter rolls and to voters
who appear at the polls without required identification.392 These
requirements prevent voters from being turned away without being
able to cast a ballot due to an administrative error.
HAVA should be amended in two respects: First, paper ballots
should be made available to those who report to the polls on Election
Day, find their names on the voter rolls, and have the required identification, but cannot wait in a long line to cast a ballot by the mechanism otherwise provided in the jurisdiction. Paper ballots cast in this
manner should be counted in accordance with the same procedures
and at the same time as regular ballots cast in the jurisdiction.
Second, provisional ballots should be made available to those who
report to the polls on Election Day, but cannot wait to even check
their names on the voter rolls or provide the required identification.393 The provisional ballots cast by those affected by long lines
should be counted just as other provisional ballots under HAVA: “If
the appropriate State or local election official . . . determines that the
individual is eligible under State law to vote, the individual’s provi-

390 See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election Administration, 6 ELECTION
L.J. 118, 121–23 (2007) (reviewing ROY G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF
VOTING TECHNOLOGY (2006)).
391 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2006).
392 Id. §§ 15482(a), 15483(b)(2)(B)(i).
393 In terms of legislative amendments, this change could be effectuated just by
adding a simple phrase, as set forth in italics below, to the operative provision of
HAVA:
If an individual declares that such individual is a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the individual desires to vote and that the individual is eligible to vote in an election for Federal office, but the name of the individual
does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place or
an election official asserts that the individual is not eligible to vote [or if an
individual declares that the line to vote in his or her jurisdiction is too long for such
individual to vote by the mechanism otherwise provided by the jurisdiction] such individual shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot . . . .
See 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a).
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sional ballot shall be counted as a vote in that election in accordance
with State law.”394
Providing voters nationwide with these paper and provisional ballot options will help to ensure that hundreds of thousands of votes are
not lost due to long lines. While these options may not be a perfect
solution, some voters are likely to welcome these options.395 Many
voters who make it to the polls prefer voting by paper ballot or provisional ballot to not voting at all, as evidenced by success of Ohio’s
paper ballot option and the millions of provisional ballots cast in
recent elections.396 On the ground, these amendments would be relatively easy to implement, as poll workers nationwide already know how
to handle provisional ballots and would need training only on the
paper ballots.
Other federal fixes for the time tax are being considered. In just
the last two years, from 2007 to 2009, no fewer than eleven bills were
introduced in Congress to facilitate or require early voting in all
states.397 In adding an early voting requirement to one such bill, Senator Dianne Feinstein expressed concern about the time tax: “In this
day and age, with lines growing at the polling places and people having increasingly complicated work schedules, I believe every state
should allow its voters to vote early and vote absentee with no ‘excuse’
requirement.”398
394 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)(4). For discussion on the ambiguities underlying this
standard, see Edward B. Foley, The Promise and Problems of Provisional Voting, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1196–1202 (2005).
395 See NORDEN & ALLEN, supra note 374, at 70.
396 In the 2004 general election, for example, nearly two million provisional ballots were cast. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2004 SURVEY, supra note 95, at 6-5.
The number of provisional ballots cast in 2008 are still unknown, but reports indicate
that 800,000 provisionals were cast in just fourteen states. Voter Registration: Assessing
Current Problems: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Administration, 111th Cong. 14
(2009) (statement of Nathaniel Persily, Professor of Law and Political Science, Columbia Law School).
397 Critical Election Infrastructure Act of 2009, H.R. 253, 111th Cong. § 3(b)
(2009); Voting Opportunity and Technology Enhancement Rights Act of 2009, H.R.
105, 111th Cong. § 107 (2009); Critical Election Infrastructure Act of 2008, H.R.
7281, 110th Cong. § 3(b) (2008); Poll Tape Transparency Act of 2008, H.R. 7246,
110th Cong. § 2(a) (2008); Vote Tabulation Audit Act of 2008, H.R. 7247, 110th
Cong. § 2(a) (2008); Voting Opportunities and Integrity in the Conduct of Elections
Act of 2008, S. 3100, 110th Cong. §§ 101–102 (2008); H.R. 6077, 110th Cong. § I
(2008); Ballot Integrity Act of 2007, S. 1487, 110th Cong. § 308 (2007); Count Every
Vote Act of 2007, S. 804, 110th Cong. § 352 (2007); Count Every Vote Act of 2007,
H.R. 1381, 110th Cong. § 352 (2007); Voting Opportunity and Technology Enhancement Rights Act of 2007, S. 730, 110th Cong. § 9 (2007).
398 Wolf, supra note 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Given the unprecedented interest in voting in the 2008 election,399 now is the moment to persuade policymakers to mitigate the
time tax on the federal and state levels.
CONCLUSION
In opining on the relatively low voter participation rates in the
United States, a leading casebook has asked: “Given the elimination of
poll taxes, how can so many people not find voting worth the minimal
expenditure of time and effort required?”400 The question assumes
that voting requires only a “minimal expenditure of time and
effort.”401 Part of this Article’s project has been to expose and undermine that premise. For hundreds of thousands of voters, casting a
ballot costs more time than they can afford. In presidential elections,
long lines at the polls routinely disenfranchise citizens who wish to
participate in our democracy but cannot due to pressing work responsibilities, family obligations, health constraints, and other
commitments.
Political officials, judges, litigators, academics, and voters themselves should recognize that disenfranchisement due to long lines at
the polls has no place in American democracy. This Article explores
how the courts have been used and can be used to strike at the time
tax, and also suggests political advocacy options beyond the courts.
Although there is much work to be done to ensure that the time tax,
like the poll tax before it, does not deny or abridge the right of citizens to vote, this Article helps to begin that project.

399 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in
2008 Presidential Election (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/voting/013995.html.
400 LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 128, at 334.
401 See id.
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